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University of California, Santa Barbara
Almost every day, we are told that innovation and change are the
chief sources of prosperity in advanced industrial economies.  Innova-
tion and change, however, often involve abandoning the production of
goods and services which are technologically superseded or relocating
their production to lower-wage countries.  All modern economies thus
face the problem of how to move workers out of outmoded activities
and into more productive ones.
What is the best way to achieve this?  In some situations, a combi-
nation of voluntary practices, including workforce attrition, reductions
in overtime and in regular weekly work hours, cuts in bonuses and
wages, and adoption of new products and lines of business can be used
to adjust to declines in business without permanent layoffs.  Some-
times, however, worker displacement, i.e., the involuntary, permanent
termination of long-term employees, is unavoidable.  In the United
States, displacement is fairly common, affecting about 5 percent of all
employed workers each year, and 2.5 percent of those with more than
10 years of service.1  Furthermore, at least for workers with high levels
of tenure in the lost job, the lifetime consequences of displacement can
be both severe and permanent (Ruhm 1991). 
Do countries other than the United States rely more or less on
worker displacement as a method of industrial adjustment?  Are the
consequences of displacement, when it occurs, more or less severe, and
does this differ for employment versus wages?  Do international differ-
ences in labor market policy, including employment-protection laws,
unemployment insurance systems, and wage-setting regimes play a
role in explaining differences in the incidence and effects of displace-
ment?  Are international differences in the experiences of displaced
workers informative about important structural features of labor mar-
kets, such as the wage returns to tenure or the amount of firm-specific
training?
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To date, questions like these have been difficult to answer.
Because displacement involves a change in individuals’ labor market
status, its statistical analysis requires panel data (in other words, data
on individuals at more than one point in time).  Such data have only
recently become publicly available in many countries other than the
United States, paving the way for a first examination of worker dis-
placement there.  The purpose of this volume is to conduct such an
analysis, with an aim to answering as many of the above research ques-
tions as we can. 
The insights gained from the research in this volume fall into four
main categories.  The first concerns the tremendous variation in the
institutions that regulate and affect displacement in different countries.
Institutions that affect displaced workers include employment-protec-
tion laws (such as advance notice, consultation requirements, and sev-
erance-pay requirements surrounding layoffs and plant closures),
income support and retraining programs aimed at the unemployed
(especially unemployment insurance), and the broader set of institu-
tions involved in the setting of wages (which may have significant
effects on the distribution of wage changes experienced by displaced
workers).
The second set of lessons from this volume concern methodology.
Because this volume has been a first foray into cross-national research
on displacement, one of its most important outcomes is a list of meth-
odological desiderata and pitfalls that future analyses of displaced
workers, and future international labor market comparisons, would do
well to take into account.
Third are substantive results concerning within-country patterns of
displacement and its consequences: is displacement, for example,
always more common among men than women?  Are the consequences
of displacement always more severe for older workers?  In a search for
“universal” patterns in displacement, we have uncovered a few proba-
ble universals, as well as some fascinating exceptions, which are wor-
thy of study precisely because of their exceptionality.  
Finally, the most difficult kind of results to generate, but poten-
tially the most rewarding, are those which make cross-national com-
parisons in the levels of key variables (such as the frequency of
displacement or the duration of postdisplacement unemployment) and
which associate these with international differences in labor market
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structure and policy.  In this area, our conclusions are less firmly held
than in other areas, but in equal measure more tantalizing.
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the four main categories
of lessons learned from our analysis in turn. 
INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING DISPLACED WORKERS
The main institutional differences among the 10 labor markets
studied in this volume are summarized in Tables 1.1–1.3.  These tables
are derived from the much more detailed descriptions in Chapters 2
through 6, and they refer to the situation prevailing at the time for
which the statistical analyses in those chapters was conducted.  In four
cases (Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany) this is the mid to late
1980s.  In the remaining six cases it is the mid 1990s.  I begin this sec-
tion by briefly summarizing the main features of employment protec-
tion laws, income support, and wage-setting policies in all these
countries in turn.  I then discuss a number of observations concerning
the variation in institutions among countries and the ways in which this
variation affects our analysis of displaced workers.  
Employment Protection Laws
As Table 1.1 shows, there is dramatic variation among our 10
countries in the scope and stringency of their employment protection
laws (EPLs).  For example, suppose a firm wanted to lay some workers
off permanently in response to a decline in sales.  United States
employers—like those in several other countries—would find the
notion that they would need to explain and justify such layoffs to some
external authority quite alien.  Yet this is precisely the law in four of
the countries under study here.  In Japan, France, and Germany, eco-
nomic necessity and/or social acceptability must be demonstrated to a
point where the decision could be defended in a court of law.  In Ger-
many, for example, social acceptability is defined by a considerable
body of case law and often involves detailed seniority rules for layoffs,
consideration of economic need—such as family size and the number
of dependents—in choosing whom to lay off, and extensive relocation
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assistance.  In the Netherlands, a firm needs to obtain a permit from a
regional employment institution before it can lay off any workers.
Much more common than justification requirements for economic
layoffs are mandatory notice laws covering layoffs of individual work-
ers.  Indeed, consistent with the emphasis on employment at will in the
United States, individual notice requirements are present in all of the
countries under study except the United States.2  These requirements
generally index the statutory amount of notice to a worker’s tenure on
the lost job (the Netherlands, in an interesting exception, ties it to the
worker’s age).  In addition, several European countries (in particular
Germany, Belgium, and Denmark) draw quite dramatic distinctions
between blue-collar and white-collar workers, with the latter entitled to
more notice.  For example, in Belgium, a white-collar worker with 20
years’ service is entitled to a year of notice, while an identical blue-col-
lar worker is entitled to only two months; in Denmark, blue-collar
workers are not entitled to any notice at all.  Finally, comparing the
level of individual notice at similar tenure levels reveals very large dif-
ferences among countries, especially at high tenure levels.  Inspection
of the table reveals, for example, legislated notice levels for a white-
collar worker with 20 years of service include zero notice in the United
States, one week in Australia, one month in Japan, two months in Can-
ada and France, three months in the United Kingdom, six months in
Germany and Denmark, and—as already noted—one year in Belgium.
This tendency of Belgium to stand out as an extreme case of EPL is
discussed and analyzed much more thoroughly in Chapter 6 of this vol-
ume.
Many U.S. readers will be familiar with the United States’ advance
notice requirement for mass layoffs, passed into law in 1988.  The
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) man-
dates two months of notice for workers involved in layoffs of a large
fraction of an establishment’s workforce.  Are such group notice laws
even more stringent in other countries (as we might expect from the
previous discussion)?  Perhaps surprisingly, the answer here is “no.”
While group notice levels can be higher for very large layoffs in the
United Kingdom (up to three months) and Canada (up to four months),
none of the remaining countries have group notice periods distinct
from the individual requirements summarized above.  One reason for
this, of course, is the relatively high levels of individual notice already
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required in those cases.  Equally important, however, in three cases
(Denmark, France, and Germany), the absence of extra legislated
notice for mass layoffs is explained by the use of a different, consulta-
tive process for managing mass layoffs.  This process involves man-
dated, case-by-case negotiations of notice, severance, and other
downsizing procedures with the works council, union, and/or local
government authorities.  The resulting “social plan” can involve many
forms of assistance to displaced workers, including job search assis-
tance and direct outplacement with other firms.
Aside from mandated advance notice and in-kind job search/place-
ment assistance, the other main form taken by EPLs involves cash pay-
ments to laid-off workers.  In our sample of countries, mandated
severance pay is totally absent in the United States, Japan, and Den-
mark.  It is rare in Australia (applying to “model” awards only) and the
Netherlands (applying only when a case goes to court).  In some other
countries it is limited in scope; for example, it applies only to a single
(albeit populous) province in Canada, and only to mass layoffs in Bel-
gium and Germany (in Germany’s case it is negotiated in the social
plan).  These qualifications aside, however, mandated severance pay-
ments can be very substantial in some countries and situations.  In the
United Kingdom, France, and in parts of Canada, they can amount to a
half year or more of pay for individual terminations; in Belgium they
can add up to several years’ wages when a plant is closed.
Finally, in a number of countries, the state’s involvement in layoffs
takes forms that are harder to quantify but not without potentially great
effect.  Extensive procedural requirements such as those in Japan and
France can lead to long, uncertain, and costly delays in implementing
mass layoffs, but it is hard to specify their cost equivalent in terms of
weeks of legislated notice or dollars of severance pay.  Consultative
requirements, including mandated negotiations with a union and/or
works council, determine the main dimensions of assistance provided
to mass-layoff victims in Germany and France.  These can be very gen-
erous but will vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the outcomes
of negotiations.  Analyses that ignore these dimensions of EPL can
seriously mismeasure the strength of EPL in some countries.
In sum, looking across countries, it is clear that restrictions on
firms’ abilities to dismiss workers vary dramatically.  Along almost all
dimensions, the United States appears at one end of the spectrum with
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the least-stringent regulations, and Belgium at the other end with the
most stringent.  Between these extremes, however, there is no consis-
tent ranking: countries can be high on some dimensions of EPL and
low on others.  Canada, for example, has relatively high statutory
notice and severance provisions, but relatively few consultative and
other procedural impediments to layoffs.  At the other extreme, Japan
requires no severance pay and only a month of notice, but has exten-
sive and complex procedural requirements for layoffs.  Nor is
“Europe” a high-EPL monolith: compare restrictive Belgium with lais-
sez-faire Denmark.  One important implication of this kind of hetero-
geneity is that any overall ranking of EPL among countries (including
the several that are commonly used in cross-country regression studies)
will not be invariant to the weights assigned to different EPL compo-
nents.3  Another implication is that research opportunities clearly exist
comparing European countries, a prime example of which is Chapter 6
of this volume.
Income Support Programs
As for employment protection laws, the countries in our sample
differ substantially in their approaches to providing income support to
unemployed workers (Table 1.2).  For example, while most countries
require some work history in the year preceding a claim, some—nota-
bly Australia and Belgium—do not.  The most common qualifying
periods amount to about six months of work in the year preceding the
unemployment insurance (UI) claim (the United States, the Nether-
lands, Japan, and Denmark).  Some are more restrictive (two years of
continuous employment in the United Kingdom); others are less (as
few as 10 weeks in high-unemployment regions of Canada).  Benefits
are unlimited in duration in Australia, Belgium, and Denmark; they can
last up to five years in the Netherlands and almost three years in France
and Germany.  Maximum benefit durations in the United States, Japan,
Canada, and the United Kingdom are all under one year.  
Seven of the 10 countries under study set UI benefits as a fraction
of predisplacement earnings; of these, 4 (the United States, Japan, Can-
ada, and Denmark) have either a maximum benefit level or a sliding
benefit scale that reduces the actual replacement rates well below the
“statutory” rate for workers with higher levels of predisplacement
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earnings.  Three do not, offering actual replacement rates of 70 percent
(the Netherlands), 57–75 percent (France) and 60–67 percent (Ger-
many), which are much higher than U.S. levels.  Three countries (the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Belgium) do not index benefits to pre-
vious earnings at all, instead providing a fixed needs-based amount
depending on family size and structure.  Finally, the countries with
limited UI duration all have some sort of fallback source of income
support (such as “Unemployment Assistance” (UA) in the United
Kingdom and Arbeitslosenhilfe (AH) in Germany).  These programs
can sometimes be quite generous (including a full rent and property-tax
subsidy in the United Kingdom, and income support equal to 57 per-
cent of the previous wage in Germany), but they are extremely limited
in the United States.  
Other noteworthy elements of the cross-country variation in
income support systems include the fact that, in several cases (includ-
ing the United States,  the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), dis-
ability or early-retirement benefits offer an attractive alternative to
either unemployment insurance or general welfare.  Also, with the
exception of France, all countries impose some restrictions on UI pay-
ments to persons who voluntarily quit their jobs.  Interestingly, how-
ever, France disentitles seasonal workers from UI, while in Canada
they are among the system’s most politically influential beneficiaries.
In Denmark, the trade unions rather than the state administer the unem-
ployment insurance system(s).   Finally, in addition to UI, some coun-
tries have income support and retraining programs targeted specifically
at displaced workers or at workers who are displaced for specific rea-
sons, such as changes in international trade.  Best known here is the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States.
Similar programs exist on a more ad hoc basis in Canada.  The most
formalized system of this kind, however, is Japan’s system of
“employment maintenance and adjustment subsidies.”  These pro-
grams make payments to laid-off workers in a (periodically updated)
list of industries deemed to be in serious decline. They also subsidize
retraining; and most interestingly, they pay wage subsidies to employ-
ers who hire workers displaced from the targeted industries.  
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Wage-Setting Institutions
Countries also differ dramatically in their regulation of the wage-
setting process (Table 1.3).  Union coverage rates vary from 14 percent
in the United States to 90 percent in France, Germany, and Belgium.
In many countries (especially the Netherlands, Australia, France, Ger-
many, and Belgium) coverage is much higher than membership
because of the mandatory extension of union contracts to nonmembers.
Some nations, like Britain and Germany, have no minimum wage regu-
lations at all; some (like the United States and Japan) set minima that
are a very small fraction (30 to 40 percent) of the average manufactur-
ing wage.  This contrasts with France’s minimum of over 80 percent of
the mean industrial wage.  Wage minima can be set on the national
level (France), national and state levels (United States),  province level
only (Canada), industry and industry-by-prefecture level (Japan), and
even nationally by occupation (Australia), with fascinating (but largely
unexplored) implications for wage structure.
Some Observations on Institutions
In this subsection I discuss three main features of displacement-
related institutions that are particularly relevant to the comparative
study of the effects of labor market institutions on labor market out-
comes, including the experiences of displaced workers. 
First, although the various subdimensions of the institutional envi-
ronment are correlated among countries, these correlations are highly
imperfect.  Still, it is probably a useful descriptive device to group the
10 countries examined here into two groups.  In the United States, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and to some extent Denmark, it
strikes one that the primary focus of displacement-related institutions
is a “palliative” one.   At least in their public policy, these countries
seem to place most of their emphasis on assisting impacted workers
after the fact of displacement, via unemployment insurance and state-
financed retraining programs.  They seem much more reluctant to
intervene in the displacement process itself than those European and
Japanese governments, who—while also adopting some palliative
measures—take what might be called a “preventative” stance.  Preven-
tative policies aim to prevent the layoff in the first place or, if that is
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unavoidable, to prevent a spell of unemployment as a consequence of
the layoff.  The idea (presumably) is that unemployment can lead to a
negative feedback cycle involving loss of skills, health, and self-
esteem, which is best avoided completely.4  The challenge—and the
source of much current debate in Europe and Japan—is how to do this
without reducing firms’ incentives to hire new workers, especially in
times or industries where demand uncertainty is high.  One option,
used in Japan, might be the payment of subsidies to firms which hire
workers formerly employed in industries the government believes
should be shut down. 
Concerning the imperfection of the above correlations, a number
of examples illustrate the point.  First, within the palliative group, dur-
ing our sample period Australia had a highly centralized wage-setting
system, while Britain had no minimum wages at all.  Canada and the
United Kingdom had fairly stringent advance-notice requirements
while the United States and Australia had almost none.  Within the pre-
ventative group, Japan has very modest notice requirements compared
to some countries (such as Canada) in the palliative group.  (Japan’s
preventative institutions take other forms.)  While Denmark has gener-
ous unemployment insurance and centralized wage-setting, employ-
ment-protection laws differ so dramatically between Belgium and
Denmark that Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning conclude in
Chapter 6 that this is the most likely explanation for the large differ-
ences in displaced workers’ unemployment durations between these
countries.
It is common in current public discussions to refer to the problem
of high European unemployment or to attribute non-European differ-
ences in labor market performance to rigid European laws and institu-
tions.  As our discussion here makes clear, however, many differences
exist within these two groups of countries.  Furthermore, comparing
broadly similar countries that differ substantially in only one or two
relevant dimensions—such as the comparisons between Belgium and
Denmark and between the United Kingdom and Australia in the cur-
rent volume, and that between Canada and the United States in Card
and Freeman (1993)—may be the most informative way to explore the
effects of labor market institutions on labor market outcomes.  
My second observation about institutions is simply that they are
multidimensional.  In particular, even legislation bearing on a very spe-
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cific action (e.g., a firm’s ability to initiate a layoff) can have several
components, some of which are not easily quantified.  Thus, as noted,
in addition to severance pay and notice provisions, some countries (for
example, Japan and Germany) prohibit layoffs unless they are “socially
acceptable” or “economically necessary” and require them to be con-
ducted according to appropriate procedures.  In Italy, mandated notice
periods are minimal but dismissals must be pre-approved by state offi-
cials with highly variable decision lags (Garibaldi and Brixiova 1997).
The main implication of multidimensionality is that simple measures
of a law’s most-easily quantified aspects (such as weeks of notice) can
be very poor proxies for its overall stringency.  Japan has very lenient
advance-notice laws, for example, but this does not mean it is easy to
lay off a worker there.  Both this and future studies would do well to
pay close attention to procedural and other details when comparing
legislation among countries.
My third observation is that not all institutions constraining indi-
vidual firms and workers take the form of legislation.  At least four
main forms of nonlegislated institutions affect displaced workers, the
most obvious of which are restrictions contained in union contracts.  In
many cases, collective bargaining agreements, especially those negoti-
ated on national levels, and sometimes extended to unorganized work-
ers, set binding constraints on minimum wages, dismissal procedures,
and other elements of the employment contract.  For example, in
France, statutory advance-notice provisions are usually superseded by
collectively bargained provisions, which cover 90 percent of the work-
force.
A second set of nonlegislated institutions that are directly relevant
to displaced workers are the mechanisms of exchange in industrial
labor markets.  An important case in point is the construction industry.
In North America this industry has a very high separation and displace-
ment rate because it is organized along craft lines: workers have long-
run attachments to their craft, but not to any particular firm, and move
with great frequency from one firm to another as projects are com-
pleted.  Furthermore, while displacement in this industry is relatively
inconsequential in its effect on wages, it is sufficiently frequent (and
the industry is sufficiently large) to have a significant effect on the
average national displacement rate.   In Britain, construction labor
markets are organized differently, and the construction industry has a
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lower displacement rate than manufacturing.  Whether or not construc-
tion is included in the statistics also affects comparisons of Canada’s
and Japan’s displacement rates (see Chapter 3).
Just as the organization of labor markets can differ across indus-
tries, countries have different national mechanisms of worker termina-
tion. Among other things this necessitates great care in defining
roughly comparable measures of displacement.  In North American
economies, for example, where temporary layoffs are common, the
precise point at which any given worker makes a permanent break with
his or her firm is often quite unclear.  Workers on temporary layoff
often look for other jobs and may or may not eventually be recalled to
their former employer.  They may even return after starting a job with
another firm.  The whole permanent separation process can thus be
very drawn out, and results using ex post versus ex ante definitions of
permanent layoffs can differ substantially.  In some other countries
(such as Germany or the Netherlands), displacement constitutes a
sharper, more well-defined event.  Still other countries have institu-
tional mechanisms, such as the shukko system in Japan—involving
outplacements with other firms within an association, or keiretsu—
where workers can be involuntarily moved out of the firm without any
spell of unemployment or any uncertainty regarding their new wage
rate.  As the next section illustrates, it matters whether we count such
workers as displaced or not.
It is of course possible that these national termination styles are
simply the result of long-standing differences in legislation among
countries (see Burdett and Wright 1989; Van Audenrode 1994).  The
hypothesis that they are caused by legislation is, however, not always
consistent with historical evidence, as Huberman (1997) argues.  In
several cases, differences in national adjustment practices predate the
legislative differences that are supposed to have caused them.  These
long-standing practices may therefore be the more “primitive” of the
institutions affecting displacement.  Long traditions, as well as histori-
cal accident, thus play a role in any complete analysis of institutions’
effects.  
A final kind of nonlegislated institution is the generally accepted
standard of relocation assistance that is “voluntarily” provided by firms
to workers who are permanently laid off.  In different countries and
industries, certain amounts of help are simply considered normal and
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fair treatment; sometimes (as in Canada and Belgium) these accepted
practices are explicitly recognized in the common law regulating ter-
minations.  In some countries, like the United States, this may be quite
minimal, but even there, significant amounts of advance notice were
voluntarily provided by firms before any legislated standard existed.5
Another example is outplacement services, provided by many former
employers, that directly secure jobs for workers at other firms.  Such
services, especially in some European countries, can make unemploy-
ment following plant closures the exception rather than the rule, unlike
the case in North America.  Voluntary relocation assistance is often
ignored in existing analyses of displacement, to some extent surely
because the U.S. Displaced Worker Survey contains no information on
these activities.  As some recent Canadian research (Riddell 1999)
indicates, however, it can be substantial even when not required by any
legislation.
Summary
In sum, the 10 countries studied in this volume can be roughly cat-
egorized into two groups.  The first, consisting of the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and (to some extent) Den-
mark, confine their market interventions largely to palliative measures
aimed at workers after the fact of displacement.  The remainder (the
Netherlands, Japan, France, Germany, and Belgium), while adopting
(sometimes very generous) palliative measures, also take a preventa-
tive stance, adopting a number of policies designed to prevent layoffs
in the event of plant closures or, if layoffs are inevitable, to prevent
unemployment in the event of layoffs.  
Within these very broad patterns, tremendous and often quite
unexpected institutional heterogeneity remains.  Policies affecting dis-
placement are multidimensional, and some of the dimensions in which
variation occurs (such as consultation requirements and approval pro-
cedures for layoff permits) can be hard to quantify.  In some countries,
collectively bargained provisions supersede legislated requirements as
the main binding constraints on employers, not just in wage-setting
decisions but in worker termination and plant shutdown procedures as
well.  Voluntarily provided assistance from firms in many cases consti-
tutes the most important part of a worker’s severance package.  Some-
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times the institution with the greatest effect on a statistic like the
displacement rate is simply the organization of labor markets on the
industry level: industries which are organized on a craft or hiring-hall
basis, like construction in North America, will have very high displace-
ment rates (and relatively small consequences of displacement)
because of the methods by which labor is exchanged.  National mecha-
nisms of displacement differ too, ranging from the temporary-to-per-
manent transition common in North America, to the much sharper
breaks which are traditional in some other countries.  No analysis of
international differences in displacement is complete without reference
to these less formal (but no less fundamental) institutional differences
between countries.
METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS FOR THE STUDY OF 
DISPLACED WORKERS AND FOR CROSS-NATIONAL 
LABOR MARKET RESEARCH
Because cross-national research on displacement—and on labor
market dynamics more generally—is very new, one of the most useful
things a volume like this can do is to alert future researchers to a num-
ber of key methodological issues that naturally arise in this context.
That is the role of this section.  Its main intended audience, therefore, is
labor economists, especially those actively engaged in cross-national
research and, most especially, that on labor market dynamics.  Readers
interested primarily in substantive results may wish to skip or skim this
section and move right on to the next section of this chapter (p. 22). 
One methodological lesson of this volume has already been dis-
cussed: the importance of getting the institutions right, i.e., taking care
in measuring all aspects, including the nonlegislated ones, of the insti-
tutional environment in all countries.  Aside from this, the main meth-
odological lessons I believe we learned, as a group of 22 authors, are
the following.
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Defining Displaced Workers 
Definitional issues arise in all comparative studies of labor mar-
kets.  For example, studies of wage structure need to decide whether to
define the annual bonuses paid to workers in countries like Japan and
Germany as part of wages.  These bonuses can be a large (and in
Japan’s case, a highly variable) fraction of compensation, and their
treatment can change one’s most basic conclusions.6   In the current
volume, however, definitions matter in an even more fundamental way,
because they concern membership in the population under study.  At
the very outset, we are confronted with the question of who is a dis-
placed worker, in a group of countries with different institutional
mechanisms of labor adjustment, each with its own nomenclature for
worker-firm separations. 
As noted already, two working definitions of displaced workers are
used in this volume.  One of these, used in administrative databases,
consists of separations surrounding a firm or plant closure (or a large
reduction in firm or plant size).  This definition does not make use of
the reported reason for a separation, either by the worker or the firm.
The other definition consists of self-reported layoffs in surveys of indi-
vidual workers.
Both the administrative-data-based and the survey-based defini-
tions of displaced workers used here have their advantages and disad-
vantages.  An advantage of the administrative definition is that it will
include early leavers in the sample of displaced workers (early leavers
are individuals who start searching for new jobs in response to infor-
mation about an impending shutdown and who quit to take such jobs
even before the plant closes).  Presumably we would wish to include
these very successful adaptees in our count of the displaced.  Another
advantage is the notion, common in the displacement literature, that
plant closure constitutes a better “natural experiment” with which to
analyze broader labor market phenomena, because involvement in a
shutdown is more likely to be orthogonal to an individual’s unobserved
ability than involvement in a person-specific layoff.  A disadvantage is
that a large majority of involuntary worker terminations occur on an
individual basis; thus a study of plant closure victims alone would be
unrepresentative of the whole population of displaced workers.7
Another disadvantage of the plant-closure-based definition, especially
Summary and Synthesis 15
if the “window” around the plant shutdown is relatively wide, is that
such definitions can include a considerable amount of normal work-
force turnover, i.e., workers who would have voluntarily left the firm
even in the absence of an impending shutdown.  A final disadvantage,
the “false firm death” problem, is discussed in more detail below.  
Consider now the survey-based definition of displaced workers,
consisting of all separations labeled as involuntary (from the worker’s
point of view).  As argued above, this has the advantage of greater rep-
resentativeness, but has the disadvantage—especially in an interna-
tional context—of relying on workers’ (and/or firms’) self-reported
reasons for why a separation occurred.  Relying on reported separation
reasons can give rise to three kinds of problems, especially in interna-
tional studies.  First, there may be simple, or “classical,” measurement
error.  Some evidence for this is available in the chapter on Canada and
Japan, which presents data from a Canadian survey in which both firms
and workers reported a separation reason.  Interestingly, while the mar-
ginal totals in these cross-tabulations are roughly similar (for example,
workers and firms both labeled about the same fraction of separations
as firm-initiated), there are substantial off-diagonal elements (workers
and firms often disagree on the cause of any given separation).  Sec-
ond, rather than reflecting fundamental differences in the source of the
shock giving rise to the separation (see McLaughlin 1991), the labeling
of separations as worker- versus firm-initiated may be an endogenous
response to a nation’s labor market institutions.  For example, the high
share of layoffs relative to quits in the Canadian economy may reflect
employers’ willingness, in the absence of experience rating, to label
workers’ separations as layoffs in order to qualify them for employ-
ment insurance benefits (e.g., Kuhn and Sweetman 1988b).  On the
other hand, Bender, Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir claim in Chapter
5 that in some European countries, “true” layoffs are relabeled as quits
(presumably with some means of ensuring the worker’s cooperation) to
avoid the many administrative complications involved in laying work-
ers off.  In Japan, a larger share of separations is labeled as voluntary
than in any other OECD country (OECD 1997, Table 5.12). Abe,
Higuchi, Kuhn, Nakamura, and Sweetman suggest in Chapter 3 that
this may, in part, reflect a cultural reluctance to admit to a kind of “fail-
ure” on the worker’s part.  
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Third, languages, survey instruments, and the actual mix of mecha-
nisms via which labor moves between firms all differ among countries.
At a mundane level, perhaps because layoffs often give rise to discom-
fort in conversation—at least when they affect us personally—they
encourage both slang and euphemism.  The variety of such expres-
sions, even among English-speaking countries, is remarkable: consider
“getting the sack,” “getting canned,” “downsized,” “right-sized,” “out-
placed,” “fired,” “dismissed,” “discharged,” “dislocated,” getting the
“pink slip,” “redundancy” (common in the United Kingdom), and
“retrenchment” (common in Australia).  Japan has “forced vacations”
and “kata tataki” (literally, “shoulder-tapping,” referring to the com-
mon method by which employees are informed of their layoffs).  More
to the point, “firing” or “dismissal” in North America typically means a
worker has not performed his or her job duties adequately; thus we
would not typically count workers reporting these separation reasons
as displaced.  In Europe it is much more common to use “firing” and
“dismissal” to refer to employment adjustments for purely economic
reasons.  For example, a worker with less than enough job tenure to
qualify for statutory redundancy pay in Britain—typically two years—
might very plausibly report that he or she had been dismissed if the
firm reduced employment due to a shortage of demand.  Analyses that
do not take account of such semantic differences may not be compar-
ing similar classes of workers.  Furthermore, international comparisons
need to decide how to compare certain methods of shedding labor
which only exist in some countries (such as U.S.-style temporary lay-
offs or Japanese shukko) with other kinds of displacements used in
other countries.
Aside from nomenclature, there are a number of other issues
involved in the definition of displaced workers that, if not carefully
accounted for, can change the main results of a one-country study or
reverse the sign of international comparisons.   One, already men-
tioned, is whether to condition on tenure: are workers who lose very
short jobs really “displaced”?   In this volume we usually focus on
high-tenure workers, but for all countries we also provide some
results—especially for displacement rates—that do not condition on
tenure in the job lost.
Related to the issue of very short jobs, how should we treat separa-
tions due to the end of a seasonal job or the expiration of a fixed-term
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contract?   The treatment of contract expirations is particularly difficult
in the United States, as its Displaced Worker Survey does not include
this as a possible separation reason.  Presumably some of these workers
classify themselves as layoffs (i.e., separated due to a “shortage of
work”), and some choose the “other” category.  As Farber (1997) has
shown, this can substantially affect estimates of displacement and its
consequences in the United States.  In Chapter 4, Borland, Gregg,
Knight, and Wadsworth document very different wage-change patterns
in the United Kingdom for temporary contract expirations versus other
involuntary separations.  Because contract expirations constitute a sub-
stantial fraction of involuntary separations in Japan, the statistical pic-
ture of displacement rates in that country (see Chapter 3) is quite
different depending on whether these workers are classified as “dis-
placed” or not.  When contract expirations are not separately identified
in the data, presumably restricting attention to jobs with longer tenures
will eliminate most of them from the sample.  To our knowledge, how-
ever, no hard evidence on this point exists.  
One response to uncertainty regarding the usefulness of survey
reports of separation reasons is to use ex post criteria to identify separa-
tions we truly believe are involuntary.  One option, used for some
countries in this volume (for example, the United Kingdom), is to ask
how the results change when we restrict attention to individuals who
experienced a positive unemployment spell.  While this, to some
extent, conflates initial conditions with outcomes, it can be a useful
descriptive device and sensitivity check.  A more extreme version of
this strategy is adopted in the Canada/Japan chapter, which experi-
ments with the idea of defining displacements by their wage conse-
quences.  This is of course tautological when measuring the effects of
displacement on wages but can be useful when making international
comparisons of displacement rates.  Specifically, by defining displace-
ment as a separation which leads to a large decline in hourly wages,
one can compare displacement rates among countries in a manner
which is unaffected by any labeling conventions—whether these are
induced by survey instruments, “cultural” predispositions against
admitting a separation was involuntary, opportunistic relabelling to
avoid or take advantage of government regulations, or semantic differ-
ences.  Future comparative studies of employment dynamics might do
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well to document the resulting statistic—the frequency of  “substantial
separation-induced wage losses”—in a greater number of countries. 
Other definitions 
Clearly, how one defines the population of interest is a major con-
sideration in any international study of displaced workers.   A number
of other definitions can also have pivotal impacts in such studies, how-
ever, and deserve close scrutiny.  One of these is the distinction
between establishments and firms: when the definition of displacement
involves closure or substantial shrinkage of one’s workplace, it can
matter a lot if the workplace is defined as an establishment or a firm.
In two of the four longitudinal employer databases used in this volume,
the unit of analysis is the firm; in the other two, it is the establishment.
Because a common practice, especially in European plant closures,
involves the relocation of large numbers of employees to other
branches of the same firm, this can substantially affect estimates of the
consequences of displacement in addition to the overall displacement
rate.  Close attention to the firm/establishment distinction is therefore
required in any comparative study of displacement or of labor market
dynamics more generally. 
In analyzing the employment and wage consequences of displace-
ment, three more definitions can have major impacts on the results.
One is the distinction between jobless durations and unemployment
durations.  Because most data sets do not make careful distinctions
between the unemployed and those who respond to displacement by
leaving the labor force, most existing studies of displacement are care-
ful to label their findings as applying to total jobless durations.
Clearly, however, the mean jobless spell in a sample can substantially
exceed the mean unemployment spell, especially among populations,
such as women and older workers, for whom labor-force withdrawal is
more common.  A second key distinction is between the mean uncondi-
tional jobless duration and mean duration conditional on experiencing
a positive spell.  In the existing literature, both are commonly reported
without further modifiers as “jobless durations.”  Especially in some
European countries, where fewer than half of displaced workers expe-
rience any unemployment at all, this distinction can be crucial, and all
the chapters in this volume pay it close attention.
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Finally, there is the distinction between wages and earnings.  Due
to data limitations, many studies of the financial implications of dis-
placement limit their attention to total earnings in a month, quarter, or
year.   (For example, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan’s influential 1993
study confined its attention to quarterly earnings.)  Even though the
earnings declines in these studies consist of a mixture of unemploy-
ment, involuntary part-time work, and hourly wage declines, they are
often discussed as if they are directly informative about hourly wage
rates.8  Yet, as Stevens (1997) showed, making this distinction can
change one’s results considerably.  The chapters in this volume are par-
ticularly careful in this regard, and future comparative work on dis-
placed workers would do well to repeat that care. 
 Control Groups
A third methodological lesson concerns the use of control groups.
While it is not obvious how relevant control groups would be to the
analysis of displacement incidence or postdisplacement unemployment
durations, they have been advocated and used by a number of authors
for the study of displacement-induced wage and earnings losses.  It has
been argued, for example, that simple before-after wage changes expe-
rienced by displaced workers will understate the wage losses caused by
displacement because they fail to account for any predisplacement
wage losses,9 or for any foregone postdisplacement wage growth expe-
rienced by displaced workers, relative to their nondisplaced peers.  The
use of a control group of nondisplaced workers, it is argued, can
address both these problems.
Some of the analyses in this volume have access to a nondisplaced
control group; others do not.  What does the experience of the authors
who can use controls indicate for the rest?  Our analysis shows that, in
most cases, simple “difference” estimates do indeed underestimate
wage losses, though exceptions exist.  In particular, because real wages
of Belgian nondisplaced workers fell during the sample period (Chap-
ter 6), their “difference in difference” wage loss estimates are smaller
than the simple difference estimates.  That said, however, in most cases
the use of a control group does not substantially change the results
unless (as is the case for Australia in this volume) the population under
study consists largely of young workers, who tend to be in a high-
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wage-growth life-cycle stage.10  One reason for this is our focus in this
volume on wage changes over a one- or two-year period bracketing the
displacement date.  During this relatively short period, wage or earn-
ings growth among continuously employed workers is not sufficient to
make a large difference in most of the estimates.  Second, we cannot
detect any predisplacement wage losses in countries outside the United
States.  We conjecture that this is largely due to the fact that wage-set-
ting institutions in those countries are more centralized: as both Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) and Teulings and Hartog (1998) have argued,
there is simply less room for downward wage adjustments at the firm
level in many non-U.S. economies.
There are also some drawbacks to using control groups.  One is
that, unless the data allow one to separate the two effects, the analysis
may conflate temporary layoffs and/or hours cuts before the layoff
with wage reductions, thus yielding a less accurate estimate of, say, the
amount of firm-specific capital lost due to displacement.  Finally,
unless one has a very large sample of displaced workers, regression
specifications—such as Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s—which
estimate completely separate earnings paths for displaced workers and
controls, do not easily allow one to estimate a large number of  interac-
tion effects with observable characteristics, like age, tenure, or gender.  
False Firm Deaths
False firm deaths is a methodological problem that is specific to
administrative-data-based studies of displaced workers.  In such data-
bases, firm (or plant) closures are typically identified by the disappear-
ance of a firm (or plant) identification number from the data.  This
could of course involve the shutdown of a plant or firm, but the possi-
bility also exists that such changes result from simple reorganizations,
in which a plant, together with its entire workforce, is simply sub-
sumed into a new firm and continues producing as before. 
The administrative-data-based chapters in this volume make
diverse attempts to deal with the false-deaths problem, as discussed in
detail in later chapters.  A common approach is to exclude from the
analysis large groups of workers who move together from one dying
firm and into the same new firm.11  This will, of course, eliminate sim-
ple takeovers, but it will also eliminate cases in which the displacing
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firm has gone through extraordinary efforts to secure reemployment of
its workers at other firms (or, in the case of plant closures, relocated
them to another of its plants).  While such efforts may be uncommon in
North America, they are more frequent elsewhere, especially in those
jurisdictions where a “social plan” must be implemented for all mass
layoffs.  In the research conducted for this volume, the results for some
countries changed dramatically after corrections for false firm deaths
were introduced.  Future research on displacement using administrative
data sources would be well advised to take great care in addressing this
issue.
Alternative Destinations for Displaced Workers
Our collective experience in this volume strongly suggests that
more attention should be given to several possible “destination” states
for displaced workers besides reemployment.  The possibility of labor-
force withdrawal has already been mentioned, but further disaggrega-
tion of this state, as well as of the reemployment state, is needed.  For
example, in Chapter 2, Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, van Lomwel,
van Ours, and Ruhm show that both early retirement and official “dis-
ability” are important consequences of displacement.  Farber (1999)
recently pointed out the importance of nontraditional forms of employ-
ment as transitional states in the adjustment to displacement.
In addition to painting a more complete picture of displaced work-
ers’ experiences, consideration of alternative destinations has several
key implications for research on displaced workers.  One is a better
understanding of existing empirical regularities; for example, how
much of the observed effects of age and gender on jobless durations
can be explained by induced early retirement or by labor-force with-
drawal?  Another is a clarification of the welfare impacts of displace-
ment; I argue below that the direction of the effect of displacement on
retirement is informative about the size of its effects on lifetime utility.
Research on these aspects of displacement, whether in the United
States or elsewhere, has only just begun.  
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Comparability and Regression Design in Cross-National Research
Finally, an interesting consensus emerged among the authors
around the broader issue of how to design regression-based studies in
the context of comparative labor market research.   A common tempta-
tion in the quest for comparability between countries is to choose a set
of covariates that constitutes the lowest common denominator, in other
words, the subset of control variables that is 1) available, and 2) mea-
sured in roughly the same way in both countries.12  While most chap-
ters in this volume provide this kind of comparison, they also make a
point of providing less-comparable results based on fuller, more theo-
retically appropriate specifications of unemployment or earnings-loss
regressions in each country.  For example, just because Japan does not
include a tenure variable in the relevant survey does not mean we
should present no Canadian results that control for tenure.  Sometimes,
ancillary information from other data sources (such as age-tenure dis-
tributions in the Canada/Japan case) can be used to provide supplemen-
tary insights into what the results would be if the fuller set of covariates
were indeed available.  International studies of labor markets, in gen-




Some economic phenomena are so deeply rooted in human tastes
or technologies that they are observed in all cultures or countries that
have been examined.13  Are there any such universal patterns in the
incidence and effects of displacement?  In this section I examine the
variation in three displacement-related phenomena—the incidence of
displacement, the unemployment effects of displacement, and the wage
effects of displacement—across four basic demographic attributes
(gender, age, predisplacement job tenure, and skill level) in all 10
countries studied in this volume.  I identify some “universals,” as well
as some fascinating and significant exceptions, and speculate on the
meaning of both.
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It is worth emphasizing at the outset that my focus in this section is
on the patterns of covariation, within countries, between demographic
attributes and economic outcomes.  Unlike the following section,
which tries to describe and explain differences in levels among coun-
tries, this exercise is not affected by international noncomparabilities in
data, as long as these noncomparabilities affect only outcome levels.
In that sense, the results—because they implicitly difference out a
fixed effect for each country—are more robust to differences in data
collection techniques among countries than the results in the following
section.
The patterns of displacement-related outcomes across gender, age,
tenure, and skill groups found in this volume are summarized in Tables
1.4–1.15.  The tables display both raw correlations and regression-
adjusted correlations, together with a list of all the characteristics held
constant in each regression.  To facilitate access to other details under-
lying the results, I also list the source table from which each result is
drawn.  The absence of a country from any one of these tables, or
“n.d.” in a cell in any of them, means the corresponding results are not
available for that country.   For each table, I pose a question for which
the majority answer—if any—is “yes.”  If there is no majority answer,
I choose what seems to me the most likely ex ante hypothesis.  In the
summaries of regression results, “insignif.” means the coefficient was
not significant at the 5 percent level; “no” means the coefficient was
significant but opposite in sign to the question posed.
Who Is Displaced? 
Patterns in the incidence of displacement are summarized in Tables
1.4 through 1.7.  Looking first at Tables 1.4 and 1.5, it is immediately
clear that displacement disproportionately affects men, and unskilled
workers, in essentially all countries.14  To some extent this is surely a
consequence of the greater cyclicality of industries, such as construc-
tion and manufacturing, where unskilled men are overrepresented.  As
noted, the craft-based organization of the construction labor market
also plays a role in some countries.  Also related to industry effects,
men are disproportionately employed in “old economy” sectors which
are in long-term secular decline in all advanced economies.  Not all of
the disproportionate incidence of displacement among men is attribut-
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able to industry mix, however: this result persists in the two countries
(the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) for which the authors can
add industry controls to displacement-rate regressions.  The higher
level of unskilled male displacement, to some extent, may thus also
reflect the continuing erosion of men’s traditional advantages in the
labor market and the increase in demand for skill that appears to per-
vade all industrialized labor markets. 
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 shed additional light on the incidence of dis-
placement by focusing on age and tenure effects.  With one important
exception—Japan—the message of these tables is essentially the same
for all countries.  First, simply comparing means for different age cate-
gories, young workers are more likely to be displaced than older work-
ers.15 As the rest of Table 1.6, and all of Table 1.7 make clear, however,
this is not a genuine age effect: when tenure is held constant, displace-
ment rates are no longer correlated with age.  Tenure, however, contin-
ues to affect displacement when age is held constant.  Thus, for all
countries except Japan, the probability of being displaced from a job
declines with the amount of time one has spent in it.  Precise causes of
this phenomenon are unclear—it could reflect institutions such as
inverse-seniority (last-in, first-out, or LIFO) layoff rules, or simply the
likelihood that high-tenure workers are, on average, better matched to
their current jobs—but the phenomenon itself appears to be universal
outside Japan.
And what of the Japanese exception?  This phenomenon is ana-
lyzed in considerable detail in Chapter 3.  All the evidence suggests
that 1) it is largely confined to men, and 2) it reflects a practice, domi-
nant among large Japanese employers, of offering essentially total job
security to newly hired young men.  Japanese workforce adjustment,
when required, then takes a number of forms, all of which dispropor-
tionately affect senior workers: a variable age of mandatory retirement,
an essentially mandatory form of outplacement called shukko, and
(especially in the last few years) simple layoffs. 
Thus, with one exception—Japan—displacement is most common
among young, unskilled men.  Furthermore, the greater prevalence of
displacement among the young outside Japan is wholly explained by
their lower tenure levels. 
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Joblessness Following Displacement
According to Table 1.8, women experience more joblessness than
men after displacement.  This phenomenon is essentially universal
among developed countries, and—as is the case for the skill, age, and
tenure patterns discussed below as well—holds irrespective of whether
we measure joblessness as the occurrence of a positive spell, as dura-
tion conditional on a positive spell, as unconditional duration, or as
non-employment at a particular (postdisplacement) survey date.  What-
ever causes women’s postdisplacement joblessness to be higher in all
countries is very likely related to the factors that cause women’s over-
all labor force participation rate to be lower than men’s in all countries.
Among these are greater participation in child-rearing (thus a higher
opportunity cost of working) and—of particular relevance to displaced
women—greater geographic constraints on married women’s job
search.
According to Table 1.9, unskilled workers experience more job-
lessness than skilled workers, with one statistically significant excep-
tion (Germany).  The most likely cause of this almost-universal
phenomenon is unemployment insurance, which in most cases pro-
vides much higher benefit replacement rates to low-wage workers.
(Absent something like unemployment insurance, one might expect
skilled workers to have higher durations as they tend to operate in more
specialized labor markets.)  In this regard, it is intriguing to note that
Germany is one of only three countries in our sample where UI bene-
fits are a fixed fraction of the predisplacement wage with no maximum,
and is the only country where the “second-tier” benefit system that
takes over when UI expires (in Germany’s case, Arbeitslosenhilfe; see
Table 1.2) has the same feature.
Although (as we have seen) older workers are less likely to be dis-
placed, Table 1.10 shows clearly that they suffer longer jobless spells
when displacement does occur.  Further, Tables 1.10 and 1.11 together
show that, unlike our incidence results, this is not simply a tenure
effect.  For one thing, tenure does not have a uniform effect on dura-
tions when age is held constant; the effect is significant in five of the
seven countries where we can run these regressions, but the coefficient
is negative in two of these five cases.  Second, age remains significant
when tenure is held constant.  Thus there does appear to be a “pure”
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age effect on postdisplacement unemployment that is essentially uni-
versal among countries with very different labor market institutions
and conditions.
What explains the universal effect of age on postdisplacement job-
lessness?  On one hand, this could reflect something as basic as the
biology of aging, making older workers, on average, less adaptable to
change than younger workers.  On the other hand, it could reflect the
fact that a greater fraction of older workers’ skills are specific to an
occupation and industry,16 thus exposing them to a much “thinner”
labor market.  An older worker’s optimal response to what are presum-
ably lower offer-arrival rates in such markets might well be to spend
longer searching for a job.17  Alternatively, since these results are for
jobless durations (rather than unemployment durations), they could
simply reflect greater labor-force withdrawal for older workers.
Indeed, Abbring et al. demonstrate in Chapter 2 that displacement has-
tens retirement in the United States.  At the same time, however, a
number of analyses find higher jobless durations among older workers
even when workers who leave the labor market are dropped from the
sample.   Thus, labor-force withdrawal cannot be the only explanation
for this phenomenon.18   Finally, longer unemployment durations could
be caused by the greater average wealth (and therefore higher reserva-
tion wages) of older workers, though if this were the case one might
expect older displaced workers to experience smaller wage losses (see
below).
What explains the very different correlations between predisplace-
ment job tenure and postdisplacement unemployment among countries
as noted above?  This correlation can be calculated for 7 of the 10
countries under study and is positive or insignificant in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Denmark—all countries with
relatively weak employment-protection laws (EPL), by international
standards.  In contrast, the correlation is negative and significant in
Germany, Belgium, and France19—all countries with strong employ-
ment-protection systems.  Notably, this correlation is positive even
when age is not held constant: even though older on average, high-ten-
ure displaced workers in these high-EPL countries experience less
unemployment than low-tenure displaced workers.
It is tempting to see the effects of employment-protection systems
in these statistics: by requiring lengthy notice periods and detailed
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adjustment plans, German-style employment-protection systems
appear to continue to shield high-tenure “insiders” from market forces
even if their firm or plant closes down.  (Low-tenure workers in gen-
eral qualify for less job protection than high-tenure workers.)  This
interpretation is supported by a comparison of the overall incidence of
unemployment of displaced workers among countries: in high-EPL
countries, displaced workers are much more likely to avoid a spell of
unemployment altogether than, for example, in the United States or
Canada.  We discuss the effects of EPL on unemployment further in
the section on “Patterns among Countries” (p. 34).
In sum, looking at postdisplacement jobless durations, a number of
very consistent patterns emerge among all the countries in our sample.
In particular, the demographic groups which are most likely to be dis-
placed are not always those who suffer the least, or the most, from dis-
placement.  In particular, young, low-tenure men are more likely to be
displaced, but they experience less joblessness if they are displaced.
The one group that suffers disproportionately on both dimensions is the
unskilled: unskilled workers are more likely to be displaced and take
longer to become reemployed after displacement than other workers.
Unlike with older workers, who also have longer durations, this seems
unlikely to be caused by a disproportionate level of industry- and occu-
pation-specific skill.  More likely, this is caused—at least in part—by
the greater relative attractiveness of income-support programs avail-
able to unemployed low-wage workers: as noted earlier, in most coun-
tries, the UI benefit replacement ratio declines precipitously with
predisplacement earnings.20  Another contributing factor may be the
ongoing decline in demand for unskilled workers throughout the indus-
trialized world, though it is unclear why—in the absence of a social
safety net income “floor”—this would be reflected in unemployment
durations, rather than simply in lower wages.
Displacement-Induced Wage Losses
In the United States, much discussion has centered around the
widely observed positive correlation between tenure and displaced
workers’ wage losses (see, for example, Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 1991; and
Topel 1990).  It is now broadly recognized that this phenomenon could
reflect either a causal effect of tenure (such as specific human-capital
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accumulation or seniority-related implicit contracts) or simply differ-
ences in average match quality between low- and high-tenure work-
ers.21  Less well known, however, is the fact that in the simplest of
dynamic matching models where workers move to better matches as
they age, the expected correlation between average match quality and
tenure (holding age constant) is negative.22  Thus, under very reason-
able assumptions, a positive partial correlation between tenure and
wages implies a positive causal effect of tenure on wages.  As Topel
(1991) argued, we can thus be fairly sure that firm-specific skills (or
some similar causal mechanism such as seniority-based implicit con-
tracts or industry-specific skills)23 is an important feature of the U.S.
labor market. 
Is this also true in other countries?  According to Table 1.12, the
answer is a qualified “yes.”  Reasonably strong and statistically signifi-
cant tenure effects are found in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, but tenure effects are generally insignificant in the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark—the only other countries where
results are available.24  In the Netherlands and Denmark, this can quite
plausibly be attributed to the very small samples of displaced workers
for whom reemployment wages are observed.  In Belgium, however,
sample size is not a plausible explanation: estimates of tenure effects
on wage losses are tightly bounded near zero.  As noted in Chapter 6,
this may reflect two features of  Belgian wage-setting institutions.  One
feature is the relatively high level of union coverage and the central-
ized nature of wage bargaining: most workers are covered by industry-
level wage contracts that affect all Belgian firms in their industry.  The
second feature is the portability of seniority across firms in the same
union bargaining unit, i.e., covered workers changing jobs within an
industry retain their seniority in the new firm.  Both of these factors
make it harder for individual Belgian workers to accept a wage cut in
order to become reemployed and may contribute to their very low
reemployment rates.
In sum, the positive correlation between tenure and wage losses
observed in the United States is also seen in two other countries (Can-
ada and the United Kingdom) with similar wage-setting institutions.  It
is not seen in a country (Belgium) with very different, much more cen-
tralized wage-setting institutions, which also happens to be the only
other country with enough data to estimate a tenure effect with reason-
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able precision in this volume.  This does not, of course, negate the pos-
sibility of firm-specific capital accumulation in countries like Belgium,
but it does imply that the effects of firm-specific capital on wages are,
in general, mediated by a country’s system of wage-setting institutions.
It also reinforces the notion, pursued further below, that a substantial
fraction of the large wage losses observed among high-tenure dis-
placed workers in the United States. may be directly associated with
two features of its decentralized wage-setting institutions: 1) partial
union coverage and 2) a high level of overall wage inequality in the
labor market as a whole.25  Both these features are less characteristic of
most European countries.
The effect of age on displaced workers’ wage losses is summarized
in Table 1.13.  Compared with the tenure effects just discussed, these
are much more robust and uniform across countries: in all countries for
which we have data, older workers experience greater wage losses.
Furthermore, with one exception (Denmark), this effect persists when
we hold tenure constant.  Like the results for unemployment, these
results suggest a pure effect of age, perhaps working through changes
in workers’ adaptability.26  Given the strength and robustness of these
results, it is in a way surprising that pure age effects on displaced work-
ers’ wage losses have not received more attention in the economic lit-
erature.  If adaptability is a function of age, there may be important, but
as yet largely unexplored, effects of an economy’s (or firm’s) age
structure on its ability to adapt to change.  An exceptionally old work-
force might, for example, help explain Japan’s current difficulties in
restructuring its economy.  Counterbalancing this, however, Japan’s
FIFO layoff system may promote the survival and recovery of ailing
firms by keeping them relatively young during sustained periods of
downsizing.
Do men or women experience larger wage losses when they are
displaced?  Outside Japan, Table 1.14 shows either no gender differ-
ence in wage losses, or a larger (percentage) fall for women.  The latter
result echoes a finding in Crossley, Jones, and Kuhn (1994), who found
larger losses for displaced women (at all tenure levels) in Canada and
who argued that this might be caused by tighter geographic constraints
on women’s job-search activities.  This geographical mobility hypothe-
sis is supported by Gladden’s (1999) research, which quantified the
effect of differential geographic mobility on the gender wage gap in the
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United States.  The exceptional Japanese result may reflect its peculiar
institution of FIFO layoffs, which—being largely confined to men—
may make the pool of displaced men and women very different.  One
simple way in which this might be true involves age: laid-off Japanese
men might be, on average, considerably older than laid-off Japanese
women, who do not appear to participate in the FIFO layoff system.
Since we have no regression results that control for age and gender
simultaneously in Japan, we cannot rule this out as an explanation of
this particular Japanese exception. 
Table 1.15 examines the association between education and wage
losses among countries.  Unlike the case of jobless durations, there is
no consistent or significant association.  The presence of an education/
joblessness link, but the absence of an education/wage loss link, is con-
sistent with the notion that income-support programs play an important
role in the jobless durations of less-skilled workers: while lengthening
jobless spells, these programs should not depress reemployment wages
and may, in fact, raise them if more job offers are sampled during the
jobless spell. 
Summing up, our analysis of tenure patterns in displacement-
induced wage losses cannot rule out the notion that substantial losses
of firm- or industry-specific human capital occur among high-tenure
displaced workers in all countries.  However, the analysis strongly sug-
gests that other factors, in particular labor market institutions, also play
a role in determining the wage losses experienced by displaced work-
ers.  In particular, it appears that predisplacement tenure affects dis-
placed workers’ wage losses only in countries with decentralized wage
bargaining and high overall wage inequality.  In different institutional
environments (such as Belgium’s), the wage-loss pattern seen in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is not present.  Our
analysis also suggests that gender differences in job search play a role
in the gender differential in wage losses due to displacement, though
this effect can also be overridden by institutional factors, as in Japan.
Finally, we document a universal positive correlation between wage
losses and age in all countries examined.  Given its ubiquity, it is sur-
prising that this relationship has not received more attention in the lit-
erature.  Further attention to the potential causes of this pure “aging”
effect would seem to be warranted in future analyses. 
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Summing Up: Who Loses Most?
Pulling together the three outcome measures (frequency of dis-
placement, unemployment effects of displacement, and wage effects of
displacement) and the four dimensions of demographic variation (gen-
der, age, tenure, and skill level), is there any one demographic group
that is hurt most on all dimensions in all countries examined?  Our
answer to this question is summarized in Table 1.16, which distills the
results of Tables 1.4–1.15 into one 4 x 3 table.  In almost all cases, the
patterns reported in Table 1.16 apply both to zero-order correlations
(not holding any other characteristics constant) and to correlations that
hold the other characteristics constant in a regression framework.
Cases where a distinction needs to be drawn are highlighted below.  
Overall, none of the demographic groups examined in Table 1.16
fares unambiguously worse on all dimensions in all countries exam-
ined, though unskilled workers come close: they experience more fre-
quent displacement, more postdisplacement joblessness, and about the
same (percentage) wage loss from displacement as do skilled workers.
Thus, as Farber (1997) has pointed out, while displacement among
skilled workers is increasing and is attracting more public attention in
the United States, displacement both in the United States and in all
other developed countries where evidence exists remains a phenome-
non that disproportionately hurts the unskilled.
Older workers fare worse than younger workers after displacement
in all countries, but they are less likely to be displaced in the first place
in all countries except Japan.  Thus, Japan—perhaps paradoxically a
culture reputed to place exceptional value on respect for one’s elders—
is the only country in which older workers fare worse on all three dis-
placement-related outcomes examined here.
Tenure effects are more complex than age effects.  First, as for age,
in all countries but Japan, high-tenure workers are less likely to be dis-
placed than low-tenure workers.  The effect of tenure on postdisplace-
ment joblessness, however, appears to vary with the strength of the
employment-protection legislation in a country: high-tenure displaced
workers seem to have shorter durations in high-EPL countries and
longer durations elsewhere.  As expected, in the United States and
other countries with broadly similar institutions, senior workers are
less likely to be displaced but experience larger wage losses if they are.
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In this volume, however, we have not been able to document seniority-
related wage losses in countries with more centralized wage-setting
institutions, and in one country (Belgium) we can rule out this phenom-
enon quite convincingly.  
In all countries, men are more likely to be displaced than women,
but (with the exception of Japan) women lose equal amounts or more
when displaced.  Overall, the most consistent patterns that emerge
from Table 1.16 are that older workers, and unskilled workers, bear the
main costs of displacement.
Other Within-Country Patterns
A careful reading of the chapters in this volume reveals four other
cross-sectional patterns that, while not fitting neatly into the above
framework of incidence, unemployment, and wages, nonetheless
appear to be universal among countries.27  One of these is negative
duration dependence in the reemployment hazard.  For all countries in
which this statistic is available (the United States, the Netherlands,
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France), workers
who have been unemployed a longer time have a smaller chance of
becoming reemployed than workers closer to the start of their unem-
ployment spell.  As is well known, this could be either a direct causal
effect of unemployment (for example, skills may atrophy with time out
of work, or workers may become depressed, discouraged, or ill) or a
pure composition effect: workers who are most attractive to employers
(on dimensions not measured by the econometrician) tend to be hired
out of the pool of unemployed workers sooner than others.  What the
data firmly reject, however, is a model in which the predominant factor
affecting durations is liquidity constraints: in such a model, unem-
ployed workers become increasingly likely to accept jobs as their
assets or UI benefit entitlements are used up during an unemployment
spell.  Increasing hazard rates are not seen in any country in any econo-
metric specification in this volume.
Related to the declining-hazard phenomenon, the authors for four
of the countries under study in this book (the Netherlands, France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom) examined the correlation between
(completed) unemployment durations and wages upon reemploy-
ment.   In all four cases, this correlation is negative, even when we use
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the predisplacement wage to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
workers’ abilities.  While consistent with a story in which longer
unemployment durations cause workers’ skills to atrophy, this pattern
could, of course, also be explained by selection effects.  Indeed, as
noted below, the low reemployment wages of German, French, Bel-
gian, and Danish displaced workers who have been unemployed for
more than a year appear to constitute the only observable gap in the
safety net protecting displaced workers from adverse outcomes in
those countries.  The authors for the same four countries also compared
the unemployment durations of displaced workers to those of workers
experiencing other kinds of separations, such as voluntary quits.  In a
finding reminiscent of Gibbons and Katz’s (1991) “layoffs and lem-
ons” result (workers displaced en masse fare better than those dis-
placed individually), it appears that—at least in the Netherlands,
France and Germany—displaced workers fare better than other separa-
tors.  This finding is particularly striking in the Netherlands, where dis-
placed workers receive higher unemployment benefits than other
separators and thus have a lower incentive to become reemployed.  In
the case of the Netherlands, the authors speculate that, once again,
employment-protection laws may play a role; nondisplaced workers do
not benefit from nearly as much relocation assistance as displaced
workers.  Further exploration of this distinction in countries such as the
Netherlands with very generous EPL certainly seems warranted.
Finally, in only two countries did the authors pose the question,
“Does displacement hasten retirement?”  Before considering their
answers, it is worth noting that, theoretically, the answer to this ques-
tion is not obvious.  While the wage loss associated with displacement
among older workers creates a substitution effect away from continued
work, an income effect could encourage later retirement: at a lower
wage, people need to work longer to finance the same level of retire-
ment income.  Despite the possibility of these income effects, however,
in both the Netherlands and the United States, displacement appears to
hasten, not to delay, retirement.   Either the income effects of displace-
ment are unimportant for workers who are displaced late in life, or a
combination of generous severance payments and social programs
makes these income effects unimportant.  The retirement-inducing
effect of displacement thus offers some insight into the long-term
effects of displacement-related wage losses on workers’ well being.  If
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such effects were very severe, we would expect older displaced work-
ers to delay, rather than to hasten, their retirement plans.28
PATTERNS AMONG COUNTRIES
In this section I discuss what can be learned from patterns in the
levels of various displacement-related phenomena among countries.
As noted, these conclusions are more sensitive to differences in data
collection methods among countries than those discussed in the previ-
ous section.  Nonetheless, as I hope the discussion will show, attention
to detail does allow some broad conclusions to be drawn.
Displacement Rates
Estimates of annual displacement rates taken from Chapters 2
through 6 are presented in Table 1.17.  Because two alternative defini-
tions of displacement are used in those chapters, these rates should be
considered in two groups.  In the first six countries (the United States,
the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia)
the statistics refer to total displacement rates—displacements of indi-
vidual workers as well as mass layoffs and plant closures.  In the
remaining four countries (France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark)
they refer to persons displaced due to the closure of a firm or establish-
ment, only.  
Examination of the first six countries in Table 1.17 yields a result
that some readers might find surprising: overall, total displacement
rates are very similar among countries with very different labor market
institutions.  In fact, the annual rates for the United States, the Nether-
lands, Canada, the United Kingdom., and Australia are all between 4
and 5 percent per annum.29  In Japan, if we restrict attention to “West-
ern-style” layoffs only, its estimated displacement rate is much lower
than all the other countries, at 1.2 percent.  However, if we include in
the count of Japanese displaced workers one source of job loss that is
much more common in Japan than elsewhere (temporary contract expi-
rations) plus another that is largely unique to Japan (mandatory retire-
ments for which the timing is totally at the firm’s discretion), the
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estimated displacement rate rises to 3.5 percent.  This is not that differ-
ent from the other five countries for which total displacement rates are
available.
The remainder of Table 1.17 presents estimates of mass displace-
ment rates for France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark.  Restricting
attention to firm closures and to employees with more than three or
four years of tenure yields annual displacement rates of 2.8 and 1.6
percent in France and Belgium, respectively.30  Comparable estimates
for plant closures are 1.0 and 0.6 percent for Germany and Denmark,
respectively.  In the United States, a little over a third of all displace-
ments are due to plant closures.31  Given that high-tenure workers tend
to have lower displacement rates (see Table 1.6), these figures seem
roughly consistent with a 4- to 5-percent overall displacement rate as
well (with the exception of France). While we remain unsure of the
precise explanation for this French exception, we note that France is
probably the country in which the false-firm-deaths problem is most
severe.  Individuals moving “together” into the same new firm can only
be identified from sample information (rather than a census of the
firm’s employees).  Thus it is possible that the value of 2.8 percent per
annum substantially overestimates France’s mass layoff rate.
How do we reconcile the rough similarity in displacement rates
among countries with the popular notion that jobs are, on average,
much less secure in the United States than in countries with strong
employment-protection laws, like the Netherlands, or with a tradition
of lifetime employment, like Japan?  One point has already been made:
at least in Japan, displacement is much more common than traditional
statistics suggest if we account for the peculiar institutional features of
involuntary workforce adjustment in that country.  Two other consider-
ations are also relevant to the Japanese case: first, displacement in
Japan is concentrated among older workers, and women generally do
not participate in the lifetime employment system.  The former phe-
nomenon makes the jobs of younger Japanese men much more secure
than in the United States, and contributes to Japanese men’s very high
age-specific mean tenure levels (see Chapter 3, Table 3.17), without
necessarily reducing the total displacement rate.  The latter raises
Japan’s displacement rate substantially when women are included in
the statistics.
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Another point concerns the relationship between the displacement
rates computed here and widely cited comparative estimates of unem-
ployment inflows, such as those in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991,
Chap. 5, Table 1) or OECD (1995, Table 1.9).  These unemployment
inflow rates are much higher in the United States than in most other
OECD countries, but they differ from displacement rates for two very
important reasons.  First, unemployment inflow statistics generally
include workers starting a temporary layoff spell.  Temporary layoffs
are much more common in the United States than most other countries
and do not constitute displacements since the worker returns to his or
her previous job.  Second, as is shown below, when displacement
occurs in the United States, it almost always results in an unemploy-
ment spell.  The same is not true in a number of European countries,
where a substantial majority of displaced workers never enter unem-
ployment.  As a result, similar European and U.S. displacement rates
are quite consistent with a much lower unemployment inflow rate in
Europe.32
A final point regarding the perceived relative insecurity of U.S.
jobs is that popular perceptions are influenced by the severity of dis-
placement’s effects, as well as by its frequency.  As I shall argue
below, the consequences of displacement do differ substantially among
countries, and—at least for the case of wage losses— these are consid-
erably more severe in the United States than most other countries. 
What, if anything, does the international similarity in displacement
rates imply about the relation between labor market institutions and
outcomes?  Perhaps, as noted, institutions can affect the precise form
that displacement takes (for example, the distinction between “pure”
layoffs and mandatory outplacements such as shukko).  Perhaps, as I
shall argue below, they can also have important effects on the conse-
quences of displacement by providing generous outplacement assis-
tance.  But it may be that overall displacement rates are relatively
immune to policy interventions.  There could simply be a relatively
fixed amount of labor reallocation that must occur in any dynamic cap-
italist economy.33 At a minimum, we have yet to see convincing evi-
dence of a modern capitalist economy with a total displacement rate
very different from 4 to 5 percent per annum. 
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Incidence of Joblessness
International differences in the amount of joblessness experienced
by displaced workers are summarized in Table 1.18.   In sharp contrast
to the evidence for displacement rates, there is wide variation among
countries in the probability that a displaced worker experiences any
joblessness.  While U.S. analysts tend to assume (correctly, for their
country) that involuntary termination almost always results in a jobless
spell, this is not the case in some other countries.  For example,
Abbring et al. draw attention to the large difference in incidence of job-
lessness between U.S. and Dutch displaced workers.  Using very simi-
lar samples and definitions, they calculate that only 30 percent of
displaced workers in the Netherlands actually experience any jobless-
ness, compared with 85 percent in the United States.  A very low inci-
dence of joblessness among displaced workers is also observed among
workers involved in plant closures in Germany (39 percent) and in
plant closures or shrinkages in Denmark (31 percent).34
As is argued in several chapters of this volume, the most likely
explanation for the low incidence of joblessness among displaced
workers in some European countries is employment-protection legisla-
tion.  This should not be surprising, since in many cases the intent of
European EPL is to prevent displacement-induced joblessness.  As
Table 1.18 suggests, these apparent effects of EPL are most visible in
the case of plant, rather than firm, closures (the French and Belgian sta-
tistics refer to firm closures and are not so low).  It is in the case of
plant closures that EPL is both strongest—involving all the provisions
associated with mass layoffs such as a “social plan”—and most
enforceable (enforcement problems naturally arise when the legal
entity responsible for complying with the law ceases to exist).  While
further research is certainly warranted, the chapters in this volume
strongly suggest that joblessness is not an inevitable consequence of
displacement, and that—for better or worse—it is possible to design a
system of employment-protection laws that makes joblessness the
exception rather than the rule among workers displaced from dying
plants.
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Conditional Jobless Durations 
Now suppose a displaced Dutch, German, or Japanese worker is
unlucky enough to start a jobless spell.   Is he or she likely to be jobless
much longer than a U.S. worker in the same situation?   Perhaps sur-
prisingly, given the prevailing view of these labor markets as low-turn-
over and “sclerotic,”  Table 1.18 provides only mixed support for this
hypothesis.  The conditional probability of long-term joblessness is
substantially higher in Germany and France than in the United States.
Given the much higher unemployment rates in these countries during
the sample period, this is not surprising.  More surprisingly, in the
Netherlands, 28 percent of jobless spells experienced by displaced
workers last more than a year, a fraction which is identical to that in the
United States.  Even more surprisingly, conditional durations in the
United Kingdom are below those in the United States.  
Why are U.S. displaced workers’ unemployment durations so un-
expectedly high when viewed in an international context?   To under-
stand this phenomenon, at least three definitional and statistical points
are relevant.  First, recall again that the statistics in Table 1.18 exclude
temporary layoff spells—which tend to be short—from the sample of
jobless durations in all countries where they are a significant phenome-
non (especially the United States and Canada, but also France).  These
short spells are included in most published estimates of comparative
unemployment durations, which tend to show much shorter average
spells in the United States.  Second, note that Table 1.18 reports actual
survivor rates (the fraction of displaced persons actually reemployed
within 6 and 12 months of displacement) rather than, for example, esti-
mated mean durations extrapolated from a sample of incomplete spells
(as in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991, Chapter 5, Table 1).  As job-
less durations tend to be very skewed, means tend to be much higher
than the median; i.e., than the duration experienced by a typical indi-
vidual, especially in European countries where the distribution has a
long right tail.  Even more importantly (in contrast to extrapolated
means), our survivor function estimates do not depend on assumptions
about the distribution of spells beyond the censoring point or on the
assumption of a steady state.
Third, note that our numbers also differ from relatively well known
statistics on the fraction of the stock of unemployed workers who have
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been employed for over a year (e.g., OECD 1995, Table 1.8).  These
“stock” statistics vary much more among countries than ours do, but
are unrepresentative of the experiences of a typical displaced worker in
each country for a different reason.  Stock statistics refer to the popula-
tion of workers who are unemployed at a point in time.  In contrast, our
“flow” statistics refer to a random sample of new unemployment
spells.  Because long spells will (by definition) be overrepresented in a
stock sample, such samples overstate the duration of unemployment a
newly unemployed worker is likely to experience.
Aside from the above statistical issues, there may be a potentially
important substantive reason why U.S. unemployment durations are so
high.  Consider a North American worker who is (ex post) permanently
displaced.  Compared to, say, a laid-off worker in Japan who has no
prospect of returning to his or her original job, the North American
worker may not search as intensively for a new job near the start of his
or her spell because recall remains a possibility.  Clearly, the effects of
the North American temporary layoff system on the jobless durations
of workers who are, ultimately, permanently displaced warrant further
research.
 Unconditional Jobless Durations
Combining incidence and duration, in which countries do dis-
placed workers experience the most joblessness?   This statistic is
examined in the final three columns of Table 1.18 for the seven coun-
tries for which it is available.  Three features stand out.  First are the
very low total jobless durations in Japan and the United Kingdom.
Contrary to many popular discussions about the “thinness” of non-
entry-level labor markets in Japan, by international standards displaced
Japanese workers do not have long jobless durations, even when we
exclude from the calculations those displacements taking place via
mandatory outplacements (shukko) and even in 1995, when Japan was
in a deep and prolonged recession.  Furthermore, when we exclude
temporary layoffs from the U.S. statistics, U.S. displaced workers in
fact experience more joblessness than do the British.  The second fea-
ture is the fact that total jobless durations in Canada, France, and Ger-
many do exceed those in the United States.  Among other factors, this
could reflect a much more generous unemployment insurance system.  
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The third feature is the large gap between Belgian and Danish job-
less durations, which is thoroughly documented and analyzed in Chap-
ter 6 by Albæk et al.  According to these authors, the only factor that
can plausibly explain this differential between otherwise very similar
countries is a negative effect of Belgium’s very stringent employment-
protection laws on the rate of new job creation.  Certainly, Belgium has
the most stringent advance-notice laws of the countries considered in
this volume; it also has the highest total jobless durations among its
displaced workers.  Thus, despite their direct effect in reducing the
incidence of jobless spells, it appears that very high EPLs can be coun-
terproductive in combatting unemployment among displaced workers:
their negative equilibrium effects on new job offer arrival rates can
outweigh these direct effects.  
In sum, rather than being at the low end of the scale, the United
States is in the middle of the pack when it comes to the total amount of
joblessness experienced by displaced workers.  One reason for this is
definitional: previous estimates of comparative unemployment dura-
tions underestimate the amount of unemployment experienced by U.S.
displaced workers because they include the short durations of the many
U.S. workers who are not displaced but are just on temporary layoff.
Another may be a detrimental causal effect of the North American tem-
porary layoff system on the jobless durations of workers who ulti-
mately are permanently displaced: an expectation of recall might
reduce search intensity.  A third factor explaining the unexpectedly
good unemployment “performance” of displaced workers in some
European countries is related to the relatively large fractions of dis-
placed workers who avoid unemployment altogether: strict EPLs pre-
vent the inception of unemployment spells, raising the number of spells
with an unconditional duration of zero.  At the same time, however,
EPLs—especially when they are very strict and legalistic, as in Bel-
gium—may also play a detrimental role in the high conditional jobless
durations experienced by displaced workers by reducing the equilib-
rium offer arrival rate.35
Wage Changes 
Table 1.19 presents estimates of mean percentage wage changes
experienced by displaced workers, drawn from Chapters 2 through 6 of
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this volume.  In all cases these estimates are formulated to correspond
as closely as possible to changes in the wage earned per hour of work
(rather than total earnings during periods that could contain jobless
spells) before and after displacement.  Because—at least in some coun-
tries—displaced workers’ wage losses vary substantially with predis-
placement tenure, the table presents disaggregated results by individual
years of tenure.  (Where the only available results combine multiple
years of tenure, I simply repeat the estimates in adjacent cells of the
table.)  Most estimates in the table consist of simple before/after mean
wage changes for workers reemployed within a year or two of dis-
placement.  Where available, however, estimates of wage losses rela-
tive to a control group of continuously employed workers are also
shown.
Even though Chapter 2 reports some estimates of wage losses for
the Netherlands (see the discussion of Table 2.22), these are not
included in Table 1.19.  As the authors of that chapter indicate, their
wage-change results are based on a very small sample, resulting in
standard errors so high that no remotely plausible sizes of wage
changes can be ruled out.  Estimates from Australia (Table 4.17) are
also excluded because they apply to a sample of very young workers
and are thus not comparable with any of the other countries in Table
1.19.   Because wage changes can differ between individual and mass
layoffs, throughout the table I note whether the statistics refer to mass
layoffs only or to the population of all displaced workers.  To ensure
that any conclusions involving wage changes in the United States are
robust as to whether a sample of mass layoffs from administrative data
or survey-based samples of individual layoffs are used, Table 1.19 also
reports estimates from the well-known administrative-data-based study
of U.S. displaced workers by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). 
Among the broad patterns that emerge from an examination of
Table 1.19, one has already been noted (see Table 1.14): real-wage
changes associated with displacement become more negative (or less
positive) with tenure on the lost job.   Two other observations are pri-
marily of methodological interest.  First, in all countries but Belgium
(and at all tenure levels within those countries), wage-change estimates
that utilize a control group of continuously employed workers are more
negative (or less positive) than estimates that do not use a control
group.  Evidently, in all those countries (even the United States, where
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aggregate real wages had stagnated for decades) the typical nondis-
placed worker experienced real wage growth during the sample
period.36  Displaced workers’ own wage declines thus understate their
losses relative to comparable workers who are not displaced.  The
exception is Belgium, where during our sample period continuously
employed workers experienced real wage declines; here simple “differ-
ence” estimates overstate the wage losses “caused” by displacement.
Second, in most cases—and especially in Germany, France, and Bel-
gium—the disparity between the simple “difference” estimates and the
“difference in differences” estimator is not large.  Disparities of more
than 5 percentage points are confined to the U.S. results of Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)—where they are small relative to the
size of the losses incurred—and the United Kingdom.  Among the
countries examined, the United Kingdom appears to be the only coun-
try where 1) continuously employed workers experience high rates of
real wage growth during the sample period (of over 7 percent per year
for continuously employed low-tenure workers and 3.5 percent for
high-tenure workers), and 2) displaced workers experience measurable
real wage declines.  In general, however, because of real wage growth
among continuously employed workers, simple “difference” estimates
usually understate the amount workers lose as a result of displacement.
However, because real wage growth in most economies during our
sample period is not very large, they usually don’t understate it by very
much.
Turning to more substantive conclusions, consider first the wage
changes experienced either by displaced workers with low levels of
predisplacement tenure (say, under two years) or those experienced by
displaced workers of all tenure levels combined.   With one excep-
tion—again, the United Kingdom—the wage changes experienced by
both these groups are either positive (as for short-tenure workers in the
United States and Canada) or close to zero (as for the United States,
Japan, and Canada overall).  The small loss (or the gain) among short-
tenure workers requires no explanation: most reasons displaced work-
ers might experience substantial wage losses do not apply to very
short-tenure workers.  The small overal1 loss stems from a simple
composition effect: because displacement rates decline sharply with
job tenure (see Table 1.6), low-tenure workers will dominate in any
representative sample of involuntary separations. 
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What of the British exception to this pattern?  A closer examina-
tion of Table 1.19 shows that the British exception stems entirely from
relatively large wage losses experienced by workers with under a year
of tenure.  Workers with between one and two years of tenure do fit the
pattern noted above; furthermore, the inverted U-shaped relation
between wage changes and predisplacement tenure observed for Brit-
ain is not found in any other country.  Given this, I suspect that the real
wage changes in the lowest tenure category in Britain may be related to
the difficulties in measuring tenure in the British Household Panel Sur-
vey and to the resulting large number of missing observations on ten-
ure there.  I shall treat them as anomalous here and in what follows.  If
further research shows, instead, that they are genuine, it will be fasci-
nating to try to understand what explains these high losses among a
group for whom they are very rarely seen. 
Next, it is hard not to notice the large number of positive entries in
Table 1.19: U.S. displaced workers with tenure of under four years,
Canadian displaced workers with tenure under one year, and appar-
ently all German and French displaced workers experience a mean
wage change that is positive.  Apparently the large losses documented
by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for Pennsylvania workers
are not universal; their focus on high-tenure workers (and, as I shall
argue below, on workers in highly unionized industries in a relatively
nonunionized, high-wage-inequality country, plus focus on quarterly
earnings rather than on wage rates) explains much of their results. 
Finally, consider high-tenure displaced workers.  In contrast to the
wage increases observed for many low-tenure workers, Table 1.19
indicates (as expected) that large mean wage losses are seen in some
countries, in particular the United States, Canada, and—to a lesser
extent—the United Kingdom.  They are not observed in other coun-
tries, however.37  What, then, is distinctive about the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Canada?  Recalling the discussion of labor mar-
ket institutions earlier in this chapter, these are clearly the three coun-
tries with the most decentralized wage-setting institutions.38  The likely
effects of wage structure on displaced workers’ wage losses are
addressed most directly in Chapter 3 by Abe et al. Using very similar
surveys and definitions, they document a much higher variance of dis-
placement-induced wage changes in Canada than in Japan.  This higher
variance has dramatic implications for the amount of lifetime wage
44 Kuhn
security experienced by workers in both countries.  For example, Table
3.21 indicates that an average 20- to 24-year-old employed Canadian
man has a 4.7 percent chance of experiencing a separation that will cut
his hourly wage rate by 30 percent or more.  The comparable statistic
in Japan is 0.8 percent.  For men aged 35–39, the Canadian and Japa-
nese probabilities are 1.7 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively.  The
much higher level of Japanese wage security cannot be primarily
attributed to a lower permanent separation rate (Table 3.5).  A substan-
tial fraction of Japanese men’s wage security thus derives from the
much more compressed structure of wage changes they experience
when they are displaced.
It is also well known that Germany, France, Belgium, and Den-
mark have much more compressed wage structures than the United
States and Canada.  This is in part due to higher collective bargaining
coverage; in France’s case the very high national minimum wage also
plays a role.  And according to Table 1.19, high-tenure displaced work-
ers in these countries do not experience significant wage losses, either
unconditionally or relative to continuously employed workers.  Fur-
ther, the fact that Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) found large
wage losses in the United States using administrative data on workers
involved in mass layoffs implies that the low losses found in the above
European countries are not just an artifact of a different data-collection
scheme and displacement definition.39
Blau and Kahn (1996b) convincingly demonstrated that interna-
tional differences in overall wage inequality play a major role in ex-
plaining international differences in the gender pay gap.  Overall, our
findings in this section suggest that a similar mechanism may be at
work for displaced workers: in countries with high wage inequality,
senior displaced workers appear to experience larger wage losses.
Relatedly—since partial union coverage in a nation contributes to high
levels of wage inequality—both Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993, p. 703) and Kuhn and Sweetman (1988a) observed that a sub-
stantial portion of U.S. displaced workers’ wage losses may in fact be
attributable to the loss of union coverage upon displacement.  Natu-
rally, this is much less of a factor in countries where union coverage is
almost universal.
Before leaving the subject of wage changes it is worth drawing
attention to two exceptions to the phenomenon of small wage losses in
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countries with compressed wage structures.  In some sense, these are
exceptions which, because of the special circumstances in which they
occur, “prove” the rule.  First, as Bender et al. point out, larger wage
losses are observed in France and Germany when attention is restricted
to the small minority of displaced workers who become unemployed
and remain so for over a year.  These workers appear to fall out of the
protective net provided both by EPL and the compressed national wage
structure.  Second are Japanese men over the age of 50 or 55.  These
men essentially leave the “primary” labor market where jobs and
wages are protected and take new “post-retirement” jobs in a very dif-
ferent sector of the labor market.  They experience large wage losses
because they switch from a primary to a secondary segment of the
labor market, much like displaced Pennsylvania steelworkers who
become reemployed in a nonunion, service-sector job.
Summary
In comparing the levels of displacement rates, postdisplacement
unemployment, and displacement-induced wage losses among the
countries under study in this volume, the following main conclusions
emerge: 
1) Although some difficulties remain in reconciling displacement
counts from firm-based versus worker-based data, comparable
worker-based data yields estimated displacement rates, which are
surprisingly similar in all countries where they are available, of
between 4 and 5 percent of the employed population each year.
This occurs despite substantial differences in labor market insti-
tutions among countries.  This phenomenon is not inconsistent
with previous statistics showing very large differences in unem-
ployment inflows among countries, and it is consistent with sta-
tistics showing similar rates of sectoral labor reallocation
(Bertola and Rogerson 1997).  Perhaps a certain rate of displace-
ment is simply a necessary feature of a dynamic capitalist econ-
omy.  
2) Given that a worker is displaced, the probability that he or she
will experience any joblessness at all varies a great deal among
countries.  While over 80 percent of U.S. displaced workers
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experience some joblessness immediately following displace-
ment, experiencing a spell of joblessness is the exception rather
than the rule in such countries as the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Germany.  The most likely explanations of this low incidence of
unemployment are employment-protection laws and union nego-
tiations of the terms surrounding layoffs, both of which employ a
variety of means to forestall the inception of an unemployment
spell.
Supporting evidence for the EPL explanation of low unem-
ployment incidence among some European displaced workers
comes from two sources.  One is the effect of predisplacement
tenure on postdisplacement unemployment, examined in Table
1.11: as noted, in France, Germany, and Belgium (no Dutch data
on this question are available), high-tenure displaced workers
actually experience less unemployment than low-tenure workers.
In France and Germany this is true even if age is not held con-
stant, even though older workers tend to have both higher tenures
and longer unemployment spells otherwise.  This is strongly sug-
gestive of greater advance notice and reemployment assistance
provided to high-tenure “insiders” in these economies.  A second
source of corroborating evidence is the observation that, in the
Netherlands, displaced workers actually get reemployed faster
than workers who voluntarily quit their jobs, even though quit-
ters face unemployment insurance penalties. As Abbring et al.
suggest, this may be attributable to extensive reemployment
assistance required for displaced workers but not in the case of
quits.
3) Given that a spell of joblessness has begun, its expected length
also varies substantially across countries.  Perhaps unexpectedly,
these conditional durations are not lowest in the United States:
the United States is in the middle of the pack.  One reason for the
unexpectedly high unemployment durations of U.S. workers is
that previous comparisons may have been contaminated by the
inclusion of temporary layoffs, which tend to have short dura-
tions, in the U.S. statistics.   Also, the fact that many (ex post)
displaced workers in the United States have a prospect of being
recalled to their former firm may reduce their search intensity
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relative to workers in countries where displacement is a more
discrete phenomenon.
4) In all countries, the mean wage change experienced by a low-ten-
ure displaced worker is close to zero or positive.  Small losses
are also observed when we consider all displaced workers as a
group, not conditioning on tenure.  In essence, this reflects the
fact that all the countries under study have a casual labor market,
in which displacement is frequent but relatively inconsequential
for current wages.  Displacements from such jobs tend to domi-
nate flow samples of involuntary separations everywhere.
5) Large percentage wage losses are observed only for workers with
high tenure levels, and only in countries (the United States, Can-
ada, and the United Kingdom.) with relatively high levels of
wage inequality and low rates of union coverage.  Just as a com-
pressed wage structure may reduce the size of gender-wage dif-
ferentials (Blau and Kahn 1996b), it may also reduce the
magnitude of the wage changes experienced by displaced work-
ers.  Relatedly, displaced workers in a partially unionized econ-
omy such as these may be more likely to experience wage losses
due to the loss of union coverage upon displacement. 
Overall, the cross-national experience suggests that—with the pos-
sible exception of Belgium and its especially inflexible employment-
protection system—it is hard to pinpoint any large negative effects of
the highly regulated labor markets of Europe and Japan on displaced
workers.  Instead, employment-protection laws appear to dramatically
reduce the incidence of an unemployment spell among workers who
lose their jobs involuntarily.  Compressed national wage structures also
appear to reduce the frequency of large, displacement-induced wage
losses experienced by a country’s labor force.  And while jobless dura-
tions, conditional on starting a spell, do tend to be higher outside the
United States, they are not dramatically so, especially when temporary
layoffs are removed from the statistics.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that strong EPLs, for
example, are good for any country.  It does mean, however—and again
with the probable exception of Belgium—that researchers looking for
evidence of major EPL-induced costs need to look somewhere other
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than at displaced workers, perhaps at the labor market for new entrants,
including immigrants, women, and students.40  There is a sense in
which, in some European labor markets, once one becomes an insider,
one is always an insider.  Even permanent job loss and the closure of
one’s workplace do not undermine the strong employment rights given
to incumbents in these labor markets.  This may harm new entrants, but
that is one subject that is beyond the scope of this volume.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Clearly, much has been learned from the research in this volume,
both about displaced workers and about comparative labor markets.
Just as clearly, however, much more remains to be learned.  Indeed, as
was noted, and as is to be expected in a first attempt at international
research on displacement, some of the key lessons from our work are
methodological ones, which we hope will speed up and improve the
work of others on these topics.  Just what should future researchers in
this area focus on, and how should they approach this subject matter?  I
consider these two questions in turn below.  
One very worthwhile goal for future research would be to under-
stand the “universals” uncovered in this volume.  For example, pure
age effects on wage losses and on unemployment following displace-
ment are observed in every country under study.  What is it about older
workers that causes these larger losses?  Can one disentangle “thinner”
labor markets from shorter time horizons, higher wealth, or declining
adaptability to change?   Why are women’s jobless durations almost
always longer?  Is it simply greater labor-force withdrawal connected
with family responsibilities or are other factors (like geographical
search constraints) at work?  Careful studies, which pay close attention
to empirical implications that distinguish these simple hypotheses from
each other, can add a lot to our understanding of labor markets world-
wide.
Another universal that could benefit from greater scrutiny is the
finding of very small, or zero wage losses for the entire population of
displaced workers in all countries.  The contrast between this result and
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s could not be more stark, emphasiz-
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ing the point that their workers may be a very special case: they are
high-tenure workers, in distressed, high-rent, highly unionized indus-
tries in a relatively nonunionized country, displaced during a major
recession.   Further research needs to carefully distinguish these special
cases from the experiences of typical job losers, whose situations are
not nearly as severe.  Just when and where do large wage losses occur,
and when do they not? 
Second are the exceptions, especially Japan.  In particular, what
drives the apparent Japanese exception to the age profile of displace-
ment?  Can a FIFO layoff system be directly observed in Japanese
firms?  In what industries is it the strongest?  How does it affect declin-
ing firms (does it keep them younger, thus helping to forestall their
decline)?  As the relative displacement rates of older workers in North
America are beginning to increase, an examination of this Japanese
practice might yield insights of relevance to North America as well.
Third is a deeper understanding of displaced workers’ flows into
labor market states other than reemployment: what is the role of early
retirement, discouragement, disability, retraining, and other forms of
nonparticipation?  Not only are these flows interesting in their own
right, they also yield insights into the welfare effects of displacement.
Retirement behavior, for example, like consumption behavior, pro-
vides clues to the severity of displacement’s effects on workers’ per-
manent incomes.
Fourth is the need to draw closer links between labor market insti-
tutions and outcomes, links which, while highly suggestive, are of
necessity drawn on a relatively preliminary and impressionistic basis in
this volume.  One key institution that deserves more comparative atten-
tion is the system of temporary layoffs in the United States and Can-
ada.  Does the prospect of recall reduce search?  During a layoff spell
with some (ex ante) probability of recall, how do workers update their
priors about recall probabilities and adjust their search strategies?
How does this system compare with one in which the break with the
predisplacement employer is a sharper, more well-defined event?
Other key institutions appear to be the level of union coverage and the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining.  This volume provides
highly suggestive, though not yet conclusive, evidence that loss of
union coverage and a decentralized wage-setting system explain much
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of the large wage losses experienced by senior workers in the United
States.   
Fifth, more needs to be known about voluntary reemployment
assistance provided by firms even in the absence of, or in excess of leg-
islated benefits.  Such help can take the form of arranging employee
transfers, setting up interviews, providing outplacement consultants,
and so forth.  Is this more, or less common in jurisdictions with strong
EPLs?  If less common, then EPLs could simply be displacing volun-
tary assistance with little net effect.  If more common, EPLs effects
may be magnified by changes in assistance voluntarily provided by
firms.
Most important, however, is the effect of employment-protection
laws and compressed national wage structures on workers who are not
displaced—who, after all, at least in any particular year constitute the
vast majority of a nation’s labor force.  Of particular interest here are
new entrants to the labor force, including young school-leavers,
women reentering after childbirth or child-rearing, and immigrants.
We have already shown, I believe quite convincingly, that for the most
part, displaced workers benefit from strong EPLs and compressed
wage structures.  Demonstrating whether or not new labor market
entrants are harmed by these practices—which may also make it more
difficult to break into the labor market and become a protected
“insider”—is a much harder question to answer.  This is because the
effects are indirect, working through changes in market prices and
search frictions rather than directly on the groups specifically targeted
by these laws.  It is, however, the most important question left unan-
swered by this volume.
How should future studies conduct the above analyses?  As our
collective experience makes clear, such studies will need to pay close
attention to institutional details, and not just those embodied in legisla-
tion and regulations.  These nonlegislated institutions include labor
unions, the organization of industrial labor markets, and accepted
mechanisms of worker termination that differ among countries for
apparently historical reasons.  Future studies also need to pay excruci-
atingly close attention to definitional and, perhaps less expected, to lin-
guistic issues.  This is hard work, but, as this volume shows, it can be
done.  The results not only test existing hypotheses and preconceptions
about how labor markets work, but they also yield new hypotheses to
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be assessed in future work.  It is my sincere hope that this volume will
encourage others to embark on the difficult but rewarding path of com-
parative labor market research.
 Notes
1. In this volume, Chapter 2, Table 2.3.
2. The United States imposes notice requirements only for mass layoffs, as defined
in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN).  
3. For a recent example of such a study and a summary of various recent attempts to
derive one-dimensional measures of the overall “strictness” of EPL across coun-
tries, see Heckman and Pages (2000). 
4. For a recent example of the effects of displacement on health, see Gallo et al.
(2000).
5. See, for example, Addison and Blackburn (1994).
6.  See, for example, Tachibanaki (1996). 
7. One might think a plant-closure-based sample would overestimate the severity of
the consequences of displacement, as congestion effects in local labor markets
might make it harder for each individual worker to become reemployed.  As is
now well known, however, Gibbons and Katz (1991) found the opposite: persons
displaced individually fare worse.  They attribute this to a “lemons” phenomenon
in which individual layoffs serve as adverse signals about an employee’s produc-
tivity.   
8. Any discussion of losses in firm- or industry-specific skills as a possible cause of
displacement-induced wage losses implicitly makes this assumption.
9. See de la Rica (1995).
10. See also Kletzer and Fairlie’s 1999 study of displacement among young U.S.
workers.
11. This is typically only possible in data sets where one has access to the full popula-
tion of workers at each plant before it disappears.  Identifying the size of a group
of workers who move together when one only has a sample of workers raises
some difficult sampling issues.  This is the case with the data from France and is
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
12. A similar comment applies to the way in which variables are measured them-
selves; e.g., the number of occupational categories used or the time units in which
wages are measured.
13. One example appears to be the effect of children on women’s labor-force partici-
pation rates.  See, for example, Duleep and Sanders (1994). 
14. The only exception to the gender pattern in incidence is in the simple means for
Belgium; this applies to mass displacements only, and reverses sign when stan-
dard covariates are added to the regression.  Some minor exceptions affect the
education patterns (a U-shaped effect in France and a positive effect of job com-
52 Kuhn
plexity in the Netherlands, when both education and the predisplacement wage
are held constant).
15. There is a tendency for displacement rates to rise a small amount after age 50 or
55 in some countries, but no other country exhibits anything like the monotonic
increase in age, starting at age 20, that is observed very clearly in Japan.
16. Skills that are specific to a firm should be captured by the tenure coefficient.  
17. See van den Berg (1994). 
18. For example, these results hold for Dutch reemployment hazards in Chapter 2,
where the sample consists only of workers engaged in active search; they also
hold in Crossley, Jones, and Kuhn (1994), who remove workers who leave the
labor market from their sample. 
19.  In France, this is only the case for the probability of experiencing a positive spell
of unemployment. 
20. Evidence in favor of this interpretation comes from a number of less-developed
countries without a meaningful social safety net.  Unlike the United States and
Western Europe,  unemployment rates are higher in these countries among skilled
workers, perhaps because only they can afford to spend time in this activity.  For
further discussion, see Dickens and Lang (1995). 
21. Any differences in general ability that might exist between high- and low-tenure
workers in a cross-section sample are “differenced out” when looking at wage
changes experienced by displaced workers.
22. See Topel (1991, p. 152).  The intuition is that, while good matches last, it is also
the case that (especially among more experienced workers) new matches will not
be consummated unless they are especially good.  Whenever the true causal effect
of tenure is positive, the latter effect outweighs the former.    
23. Neal (1995) has noted that the tenure effect also captures industry-specific skills
when (as is usually the case)  tenure in the industry is not in the list of regressors. 
24. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) presented estimates of stronger tenure effects on
wages in Japan than in the United States.  Teulings and Hartog (1998, chap. 1)
presented estimates for 11 countries that are consistent with the patterns noted
below (higher tenure effects in “noncorporatist” countries).  Unlike the displace-
ment-based estimates in this volume, however, all these estimates are based on
cross-section data only, and thus do not correct for unobserved ability differences
between workers of different tenure levels.   
25. See Teulings and Hartog  (1998), Table 1 of the synopsis, and Chapter 5.
26. If anything, human-capital theory predicts the opposite: older workers should
invest less in new skills; to the extent they pay their own training costs, this
should raise their starting wages on their postdisplacement jobs. As discussed for
unemployment durations, however, older workers may have more specialized
industry- or occupation-specific skills that are not completely captured by the ten-
ure variables used here.  Another explanation might be a composition effect
related to induced retirement.  For this to explain the age effect, however, it would
have to be the case that among older workers, those with low reemployment wage
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prospects (relative to their previous job) are more likely to return to work.  This
seems unlikely. 
27. At least this is true in the sense that, for every country in which the given correla-
tion is reported in this volume, it has the same sign.
28. This question has recently been addressed using consumption data by Stephens
(1999) and by Browning and Crossley (2000). 
29. This assumes the Australian average for men (3.9) and women (5.2) together is
between 4 and 5 percent. 
30. I focus on closures rather than substantial shrinkage of a firm’s or plant’s work-
force for two reasons.  One is comparability among all four countries: in France
and Germany, the statistics on closures are the only ones reported.  The more
important reason is conceptual: estimated displacement rates due to firm or plant
shrinkage in Belgium and Denmark may be substantially inflated by voluntary
turnover during the window period, especially in small firms and plants. 
31. See, for example, Kuhn and Sweetman (1999, Table 1). 
32. Consistent with our interpretation, Bertola and Rogerson (1997) also noted a
broad uniformity among countries in job turnover rates, despite large differences
in unemployment inflows.  They also made reference to employment-protection
laws as an explanation for this pattern because they allow worker reallocation to
occur without an intervening unemployment spell.
33. One could counter, of course, that even if the total amount of labor reallocation is
fixed, the share of such reallocation that is involuntary (from the worker’s point of
view) may not be.  Bertola and Rogerson (1997), however, reported similar rates
of labor reallocation (as measured by job turnover) among countries, and present
theoretical arguments—related to wage compression—for why most reallocation
is involuntary from the worker’s point of view.  
34. It may be worth recalling (see Note 30) that the Danish data could be contami-
nated by normal turnover during  the “window” period, especially in small plants.
This is of much less concern in the German data, which restrict attention to plant
closures only.
35. Other European countries tend to have more flexible EPL provisions, which may
be more sensitive to the circumstances surrounding each mass layoff or plant clo-
sure, because they involve case-by-case negotiations in the construction of a
“social plan.” 
36. Recall that the control group wage-growth rates that are relevant here occur
within cohorts, while most aggregate wage-growth statistics make comparisons
among cohorts.
37. The six percent loss (relative to controls) among Danish workers with three or
more years of tenure is the most negative point estimate, but—due in part to the
small sample size—the 95 percent confidence interval stretches from about –2 to
–10 percent (see Chapter 6, Table 6.10B).      
38. These countries also tend to have the highest measured earnings inequality, espe-
cially at the low end of the earnings distribution—which is most relevant to the
losses experienced by displaced workers.  See, for example, the statistics on the
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ratio between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the earnings distribution in OECD
1993, Table 5.2. 
39. Another possible manifestation of the relation between wage-setting institutions
and displaced workers’ wage losses is alluded to in Chapter 4 by Borland et al.  In
many respects, the United Kingdom and Australia have similar labor markets,
with low levels of employment protection and moderate levels of union member-
ship.  One big difference, however, is the very centralized system of wage-setting
institutions embodied in Australia’s awards system.  Noting that they found sub-
stantial wage losses in Britain but not Australia, these authors speculated that
wage-setting institutions may play a role.  As they pointed out, however, the fact
that their Australian sample was much younger could also have accounted for
some, or all, of this difference.
40. These issues have recently been addressed for a sample of Latin American coun-
tries by Heckman and Pages (2000). 
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Consultation and other 
requirements





Workers under age 45: 
0.25 month per year service 
Over age 45:
0.5 months per year service, up 
to 6 months 
Notice begins after permit issued 
No special 
provision
Only in court 
cases
No special provisions





One month No special 
provision
None Extensive procedural 
requirements, including 
use of all reasonable 
alternatives (early 
retirements, cutting 
temporary and part-time 
employment) before 
layoffs of “regular” 
employees
Canadab No 0.25 Month per year service, 
up to 2 months
Up to 4 months 
for layoffs 
of over 500 
workers
0.25 Months 
per year of 
service, up to
6 monthsc
Notify local authorities of 
mass layoffs
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U.K. No 0.25 Month per year service, 
up to 3 months. 
1 Month for 
layoffs of 
20–100 workers




0.25 Month per 
year of service 
between ages
22–40
0.375 Months per 




Australia No 0.25 Month in “typical” 
pre-1984 award 




0.5 Months per 
year service,  up 
to 2 mo. 
(in TCR-test case 
awards only) 
Restrictions on 
terminations specified in 
award settlements, which 
vary by occupation, 






0.5–2 Years service: 1 month
>2 Years service: 2 months
However, legal procedures before
notice can be issued take from
1 to 2.5 months.










0.17 month salary  
per year of
 service
Employer must offer a 
retraining option
Workers have priority in 
future hiring for one year
Must share accounting
information with works 
council
In larger layoffs, a “social 















Consultation and other 
requirements
Germany Yes—layoffs of 
workers with > 6 
months tenure
prohibited unless 




1 month after 5 years
3 months after 10 years
White collar workers:
3 months after 5 years
6 months after 10 years
No special 
legislation; may 





Works council must be 
consulted for all layoffs
For large layoffs, council 
can demand a “social 
plan”
For large layoffs, must 
inform local employment 
office
Belgium No Blue-collar workers: 
<20 years service: 1 month
>20 years service: 2 months
White-collar workers: 
<5 years service: 3 months 
5-9 years: 6 months
10-15 years: 9 months, etc. 
(courts often award even 
longer notice periods for white-
collar workers)
None One month’s 
pay per year 
service in plant 
closures (less in 
mass layoffs)
In addition to statutory 
minima, notice periods for 
white-collar workers are 
affected by an extensive 
body of case law.  Typical 
periods depend on age, 
specialization, tenure and 
wage,  ranging up to 36 
months
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Denmark No White-collar workers only: 
increases with tenure to a 
maximum of 6 months
None None For mass layoffs: required 
to notify regional labor 
market board and 
negotiate with union
NOTE: For comparability, any notice or severance requirements legislated in weeks have been converted to monthly amounts, at 0.25
months per week (exception: 26 weeks is converted as 6 months).
a Employees on fixed-term contracts are exempt from these requirements.
b Canadian legislation varies by province.  Figures are for Ontario, which is the largest province and fairly typical (except for severance
pay).
c Only applies to Ontario (Canada’s most populous province).  Ontario has about 40% of the national population. 
d The maximum period of service for which severance is paid is 20 years.  Statutory redundancy payments are free of income tax.
e The TCR (Termination, Change, and Redundancy) test case award incorporated stronger restrictions on dismissals for the first time; its
provisions have been adopted by only a minority of awards since 1984. 
f Since the 1985 Employment Promotion Act, nonrenewable limited-duration contracts of up to 18 months have been exempt from these
requirements.
60Table 1.2 Institutions Affecting Displacement: Unemployment Insurance Systems
Country Qualifying period Duration of benefits Replacement rate “Fallback” program Comments
U.S.A.a 26 Weeks of work 
in past year
26 Weeks (plus 13 
weeks extended 
benefits in years or 
states with high 
unemployment)







available to single 
parents only
Lifetime limit of 5 
years
Very low takeup rate 
Quitters disqualified
Benefits taxed as 
income
Netherlands 26 Weeks of work in 
past year
6 Months to 5 years, 
depending on 
employment history










accept jobs  below 
their previous “skill” 
level
Japan 26 Weeks of work 
in past year 
90–300 Days; 




on age and rate of 
pay, to a maximum
Universal welfare, 
unlimited duration
Some restrictions on 
quitters
Canada 10–20 Weeks of 






weeks worked and 
local unemployment 
rate
55%, to a maximum Universal welfare, 
unlimited duration
Quitters disqualified
Easy to requalify in 
successive years based 
on seasonal work.
Higher takeup than 
U.S.A.
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U.K. 2 Years continuous 
employmentb










to both UA and UI
UA is often more 
generous than UI, 
especially if no other 
earners in the 
household.  UA can 
include full rent and 
property tax subsidy.
Australia None Unlimited Flat amounts based 
on family income, 
family size, and 
home ownership
Unemployment
benefit itself acts as 
“the” welfare system.
Benefits low relative 
to average earnings
France 5 Alternative ways 
to qualify for 
different benefit 
durations, depending 
on work history in 
last 3 years




57–75% of previous 
earnings (no 
maximum); benefit 
rate falls after an 









Country Qualifying period Duration of benefits Replacement rate “Fallback” program Comments
Germany 12 months in last 3 
years (for AG or 
Arbeitslosengeld)
156–832 Days, 
depending on age 
and employment 
history
67% of previous net 












Belgium None Unlimited, though 
benefits reduced 
after one year of 
unemployment
Effectively, benefits 
are flat amounts 
based on family 
status and current 
incomec
UI functions as the 


















UI funds administered 
by trade union; very 
wide coverage
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a Provisions vary by state.  Typical parameters are presented.
b Before 1988, insurance contributions could be credited during unemployment spells to maintain eligibility.
c Official replacement rates are 60% in the first year of unemployment and 40% after that.  In most cases these are made irrelevant by a
higher flat benefit amount based on the family’s “needs.”
d Some new entrants can qualify for UI based on apprenticeship training periods.
e Throughout the sample period in this volume (until the early 1990s) unemployed workers could requalify for UI by participating in a
public employment scheme.










U.S.A. Density 14.5% (1996) 
(10% in private sector)




State and federal; federal 
supersedes state if higher 
$5.15/hr (1997) (40% of 
average production worker
wage)




National 14.01 Guilders (US$7)/hr
Japan Membership 24% (1998)
Coverage similar 
Firm-level bargaining, no 
extension
Prefectural minima, plus 
some industry minima 
within prefectures 
4868 Yen/day (weighted 
regional minimum, 1995); 
36% of mean contract wage
Canada Membership 31% Coverage 
34% (1997)
Firm-level bargaining, no 
extension
Provincial (with a small 
federal sector)
38% of mean manufacturing 
wage, 1994
U.K. Membership about 30% 
Coverage 37% (1996)
Firm-level bargaining, no 
extension
None: wages councils 
were abolished in 1993
None
Australia Membership 31% (1996) 
Coverage 80% ((1990)a
Industrial tribunals, with 
union and firm 
representation; set wage 
“awards” by occup. and 
industry
Awards pervasive; 
no other wage minima 
Set by awards 




National minimum wage 84% of mean industrial wage 
(1995)
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Germany Membership 32% 
Coverage 90% (1992)a
Industry- and regional-level 
bargaining, extension is 
pervasive
No minimum wage apart
 from (extended) union 
contracts
None
Belgium Membership 51% 
Coverage 90% (1990)a
National-, industry-,
 and firm-level bargaining 
(pyramidal)
National minimum wage Low national minimum, 
generally superseded by 
extended union contracts





No minimum wage apart 
from (extended) union 
contracts
None
a Figures from OECD 1994, chart 5.1.
66Table 1.4 Displacement and Gender: Are Men More Likely to Be Displaced? 








U.S.A. Yes 2.2 n.d.a — —
Netherlands Yes 2.7 Yes 2.9 Age, tenure, educ., 
part-time, industry, 
firm size, wage, 
occup., job complexity
Japan Yes, but small 
difference
3.8 n.d. — —
Canada Yes, very much 3.8 n.d. — —
U.K. yes 4.2 Yesb 4.3 Age, tenure, educ., 
part-time, industry, 
firm size, marital 
status, children
Australia Yes 4.11 n.d. — —
Belgium No, women
 more likely
6.4 Yes 6.5 Age, tenure, blue-
collar, wage
Denmark No difference 6.4 Yes 6.2 Age, tenure, blue-
collar, wage
NOTE: The chapter on France and Germany presents results for men only and thus is excluded from this table.
a n.d. = no data available.
b But significant only for temporary contract expirations.
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Table 1.5 Displacement and Skills: Are Unskilled Workers More Likely to Be Displaced?
Comparing means Using regressions







Netherlands Job complexity Yes 2.7 No,a lower rates 
in less 
complex jobs
2.8, 2.9 Gender, age, 
tenure, educ., part-
time, industry, firm 
size, wage, occup.
Wage n.d.b — Yes 2.8, 2.9 Gender, age, 
tenure, educ., part-
time, industry, firm 
size, occup., job 
complexity
Education Yes  
(weak effect)
2.7 Insignif.c 2.8, 2.9 Gender, age, 
tenure, part-time, 
industry, firm size, 
wage, occup., job 
complexity
U.K. Education Nonmonotonic: 
lowest disp. in 
middle groups
4.2 Yes 4.3 Gender, age, 
tenure, part-time, 






Comparing means Using regressions







France Education n.d. — Lowest disp. in  
middle groups
5.3 Gender,d age, 
tenure
Belgium B/W collar Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, 
tenure, wage 
Wage Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, 
tenure, blue-collar
Denmark B/W collar Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, 
tenure, wage
Wage Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, 
tenure, blue-collar
NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass dis-
placements.  No results on skills and displacement rates are available in this volume for the U.S.A., Australia, Japan, Canada, or Ger-
many.  For the United States, Farber (1997) showed that educated workers are much less likely to be displaced than other workers,
though the relative displacement rates of these groups increased in the 1990s.  For Canada, Picot, Lin, and Pyper (1997) showed that
Canadians earning high wages are much less likely to be displaced than other Canadians.
a No = coefficient significant at 5% level but opposite in size to question posed.
b n.d. = no data available.
c Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d Regressions run for men only.
69
Table 1.6 Displacement and Age: Are Younger Workers More Likely to Be Displaced? 








U.S.A. Yes 2.4 n.d.a — —
Netherlands Yes 2.7 Small, nonmonotonic  
effect
2.9 Gender, tenure, educ., 
part-time, industry, 
firm size, wage, 
occup., job complexity
Japan No, less likely 3.8 n.d. — —
Canada Yes, but disp. rates
 rise after 55
3.8 n.d. — —
U.K. Yes, but disp. rates
rise after 55
4.2 Yesb 4.3 Gender, tenure, educ., 
part-time, industry, 
firm size, marital 
status, children
Australia No effect 4.13 n.d. — —
France Yes, but disp. rates 
rise after 50
5.2 No 5.3 Gender,c tenure, educ. 
Germany Yes, but disp. rates 
rise after 50













Belgium Yes, but 
not strongly
6.4 Yes, within 
displacing firms, 
otherwise nod
6.5 Gender, tenure, blue-
collar, wage (but the 
tenure variable groups 
together all those with 
6 or more years)
Denmark No effect 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, tenure, blue-
collar, wage (but the 
tenure variable groups 
together all those with 
6 or more years)
NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass dis-
placements.
a n.d. = no data available.
b But significant only for temporary contract expirations.
c Regressions run for men only.
d In a sample of all employed workers, displacement is correlated to age between ages 20 and 59.  Teens have lower displacement rates
and workers over 60 have higher rates than those 20–59.
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Table 1.7 Displacement and Tenure: Are Low-Tenure Workers More Likely to Be Displaced?





(table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Yes, 
strongly
2.3 n.d.a — —
Netherlands Yes, 
strongly
2.6 Yes 2.9 Gender, age, educ., part-time, industry, 
firm size, wage, occ., job complexity
Canada Yesb — n.d. — —
U.K. Yes, 
strongly
4.2 Yes 4.3 Gender, age, educ., part-time, industry, 
firm size, marital status, children
Australia Yes 4.12, 4.13 n.d. — —
France Yes, 
not strongly
5.2 Yes 5.3 Gender,c age, educ. 
Germany Yes 5.4 Yes 5.5 Gender, age, educ., industry
Belgium Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, blue-collar, wage
Denmark Yes 6.4 Yes 6.5 Gender, age, blue-collar, wage
NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass
displacements.
a n.d. = no data available.
b No results are reported in this volume for Japan or Canada.  However, when jobs lasting under a year were excluded from the Canadian
displacement counts, displacement rates fell dramatically.
c Regressions run for men only.
72Table 1.8 Joblessness and Gender: Do Displaced Women Experience More Joblessness? 
Comparing means Using regressions




 (table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Prob. (positive 
spell)
n.d.a — Insignif.b 2.12 Age, tenure, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Duration of 
positive spells
Yes 2.10 Yes 2.12 Age, tenure, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Unconditional
duration
Yes 2.10 Yes 2.12 Age, tenure, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice








Yes 3.11 n.d. — —
Canada Unconditional 
duration
Yes 3.11 n.d. — —
U.K. Duration of 
positive spells
n.d. — Insignif. 4.6 Age, tenure, qualif., married, 
children, part-time, occup., 





n.d. — Insignif. 4.6 Age, tenure, qualif., married, 
children, part-time, occup., 
industry, industry declining, firm 
size
Australia Survey date 
reemployment
Yes 4.12, 4.13 Yes 4.16 Age, educ., math and reading 
aptitude, unempl. rate in last 
occup.




n.d. — Yes 6.8 Age, tenure, last wage, white-
collar




n.d. — Insignif. 6.8 Age, tenure, last wage, white-
collar (very small sample)
NOTE: The chapter on France and Germany presents results for men only.  Except where noted, durations refer to total joblessness fol-
lowing displacement, whether due to unemployment or labor-force withdrawal.
a n.d. = no data available.
b Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c For Japan and Canada, separate duration regressions were run for women and men, but no predictions at common values of the regres-
sors were performed.
74Table 1.9 Joblessness and Skills: Do Skilled Displaced Workers Experience Less Joblessness?
Comparing means Using regressions
Country









n.d.a — Yes 2.12 Gender, age, tenure, married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Duration of 
positive spells
n.d. — Yes 2.12 Gender, age, tenure, married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Unconditional
duration
n.d. — Yes 2.12 Gender, age, tenure, married, 












n.d. — Insignif. 3.12 Gender,c age, firm size, part-time, 






n.d. — Yes 3.13 Gender,c age, tenure, firm size, part-
time, industry, region (only the 
predisp. wage is signif. for men; only 





n.d. — Insignif. 4.6 Gender, age, tenure, occup., married, 




n.d. — Insignif. 4.6 Gender, age, tenure, occupation, 
married, children, part-time, industry, 






Yes 4.13 Yes 4.16 Gender, age, math and reading 
aptitude, unempl. rate in last occup.



























n.d. — Insignif. 6.8 Gender, age, tenure, white-collar (very
small sample; positive point estimate)
NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass
displacements.
a n.d. = no data available.
b Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d Regressions were run for men only.
e No = coefficient significant at 5% level but opposite in sign to question posed.
76Table 1.10 Joblessness and Age: Do Older Displaced Workers Experience More Joblessness?
Comparing means Using regressions
Country Jobless measurea Result
Source
 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Prob. (positive spell) n.d.b — Yes 
(borderline
significant)
2.12 Gender, tenure, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Duration of positive 
spells
Yes 2.10 Yes 2.12 Gender, tenure, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Unconditional duration Yes 2.10 Yes 2.12 Gender, tenure, educ, married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Netherlands Duration of positive 
spells  (insured 
unemployment)
Yes 2.16 Yes 2.17 Gender, wage, married, urban, 
part-time, UI sanction
Japan Unconditional duration n.d. — Insignif. 3.12 Gender,c educ., firm size, part-
time, industry, age-sex specific 
U/V ratio.
Canada Unconditional duration n.d. — U-shaped
 effect
3.13 Gender,c educ., firm size, part-
time, industry, region  (result also 
holds when tenure, union and 
wage are included)
U.K. Duration of positive 
spells
n.d. — Yes 4.6 Gender, tenure, qualif., occup., 
married, children, part-time, 
industry, industry declining, firm 
size
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Unconditional duration n.d. — Yes 4.6 Gender, tenure, qualif., occup., 
married, children, part-time, 
industry, industry declining, firm 
size




4.13 Yes 4.16 Gender, educ., math and reading 
aptitude, unempl. rate in last 
occupation [becomes insignif. 
when year dummies included]
France Duration of positive 
spells
n.d. — Insignif. 5.7 Gender,d tenure, educ., year 
Germany Duration of positive 
spells
n.d. — Yes 5.9 Gender,d tenure, educ., year
Belgium Duration of positive 
spells  (insured 
unemployment)
n.d. — Yes 6.8 Gender, tenure, last wage, white-
collar
Denmark Duration of positive 
spells  (insured 
unemployment)
n.d. — Insignif. 6.8 Gender, tenure, last wage, white-
collar (very small sample; point 
estimates suggest older workers 
do have longer durations)
a Except where noted, durations refer to total joblessness following displacement, whether due to unemployment or labor-force withdrawal.
b n.d. = no data available.
c Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d Regressions were run for men only.
78Table 1.11 Joblessness and Tenure: Do High-Tenure Displaced Workers Experience More Joblessness?
Comparing means Using regressions
Country Jobless measure Result
Source
 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Prob. (positive spell) n.d.a — Insignif. 2.12 Gender, age, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Duration of positive 
spells
Yes 12.0 Insignif. 2.12 Gender, age, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Unconditional duration Yes 2.10 Insignif. 2.12 Gender, age, educ, married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice
Canada Unconditional duration n.d. — Yes 3.13 Gender,c age, educ., firm size, 
part-time, industry, region (result 
also holds when union and wage 
are included)
U.K. Duration of positive 
spells
n.d. — Yes 4.6 Gender, age, qualif., occup., 
married, children, part-time, 
industry, industry declining, firm 
size (but age controls are coarse 
and the only signif. effect is for 
tenure < 1 year)
Unconditional duration n.d. — Yes 4.6 Gender, age, qualif., occup., 
married, children, part-time, 
industry, industry declining, firm 
size (see comment above)
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4.12, 4.13 n.d. — —




5.6 n.d. — —
Duration of positive 
spells
n.d. — Yes 5.7 Gender,e age, educ., year




5.8 n.d. — —
Duration of positive 
spells




5.9 Gender,b age, educ., year 
Belgium Duration of positive 
spells  (insured 
unemployment)









Comparing means Using regressions
Country Jobless measure Result
Source
 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant
Denmark Duration of positive 
spells  (insured 
unemployment)
n.d. — Insignif. 6.8 Gender, age, last wage, white-
collar (very small sample; point 
estimates suggest senior workers 
have shorter durations)
NOTE: No information on tenure is available in the Netherlands or Japan.  Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on
mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass displacements.
a n.d. = no data available.
b Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d In a sample of all employed workers, displacement is correlated to age between ages 20 and 59.  Teens have lower displacement rates
and workers over 60 have higher rates than those 20–59.
81
Table 1.12 Wage Loss and Tenure: Do High-Tenure Displaced Workers Experience Larger Wage Losses?





 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Weekly earnings Yes 2.19 Yes 2.21 Gender, age, educ., married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, 
notice, union
Netherlands Monthly earnings, 
within an 
employment spell
n.d.b — Yes, though 
significant only for 
tenure under vs. 
over 1 year 
2.22 Gender, age, educ., married, 
immig., spell length, type of 
displacement
Canada Hourly wage rate Yes 3.16 Yes 3.20 Gender,c age, educ., firm size 
(pre and post), industry 
change, visible minority, 
union (pre and post), 
province
U.K. Weekly earnings Yes, except 
lowest tenure 
category
4.8a Yes, but signif. only 
in Table 4.10 
(which includes all 
separation reasons)
4.9, 4.10 Gender, age, educ., change in 
firm size, industry decline, 






Yes 4.8b Yes, but signif. only 
in Table 4.10 
(which includes all 
separation reasons)
4.9, 4.10 Gender, age, educ., change in 










 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant





16.11 Gender, age, blue-collar, 
predispl. firm size, closure, 
region, occup.d





6.11 Gender, age, blue-collar, 
predispl. firm size, closure, 
region, occup.d
NOTE: Data on predisplacement tenure are unavailable for Australia or Japan.  Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact
wage losses with demographic characteristics.
In all cases the dependent variable is a wage measure (pay per unit of time worked), not an earnings measure.  Details are as follows:
U.S.: Change in log wages, up to three years after displacement
Netherlands: Change in log wages, up to four months after displacement
Japan: Worker’s self-reported percentage change in wages, within a year of displacement
Canada: (calculated) percentage change in wages, from actual pre- and postdisplacement wages up to 16 months apart
U.K. Change in log wages, one year after displacement
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a Australia: Change in log wages, one to two years after displacement
Belgium: Log hourly wage rate two years after displacement
Denmark: Log hourly wage rate two years after displacement
b n.d. = no data available.
c Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
84Table 1.13 Wage Loss and Age: Do Older Displaced Workers Experience Larger Wage Losses?










U.S.A. Weekly wages Yes (except for 
oldest group)





Netherlands Monthly earnings, 
within an 
employment spell
n.d.b — Insignif.c 2.22 Gender, tenure, 
educ., married, 
immig., spell 
length, type of 
displacement






3.14 Yes 3.18, 3.19 Gender,d educ., 
firm size (pre and 
post), type of 
displacement






Yes (both men 
and women)
3.15 Yes 3.20 Gender,d educ., 
firm size (pre and 
post), industry 
change, visible 
minority (result is 
robust to additional 
controls for tenure 
and union) 
U.K. Weekly wages Yes 4.8a Insignif. 4.9 Gender, tenure, 
educ., change in 






Yes 4.8b Yes 4.9 Gender, tenure, 
educ., change in 
firm size, industry 
decline, unempl. 
duration
Australia Average weekly 
earnings



















Belgium Daily wage rate n.d. — Yes, but only
 over age 60
6.11 Gender, tenure, 
blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, 
closure, region, 
occup.f
Denmark Hourly wage rate n.d. — Yes, but only 
over age 60
6.11 Gender, tenure, 
blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, 
closure, region, 
occup.f
NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics.
a See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b n.d. = no data available.
c Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d Separate regressions were run for women and men.
e Sample includes quitters, with a dummy for displaced.
f Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
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Table 1.14 Wage Loss and Gender: Do Displaced Women Experience Larger Wage Losses?





 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant
U.S.A. Weekly wages Yesb 2.19 Insignif. 2.21 (col. 3) Age, tenure, educ, married, 
nonwhite, immig., closure, 
notice, union
Netherlands Monthly earnings, 
within an 
employment spell
n.d. — Insignif. 2.22 Age, tenure, educ, married, 
immig., type of 
displacement






3.14 n.d. — —





3.15 n.d. — —
U.K. Weekly wages Yes 4.8a Insignif. 4.9 Age, tenure, educ., change 
in firm size, industry 
decline, unemp. duration, 





Yes 4.8b Insignif. 4.9 Age, tenure, educ., change 










 (table no.) Result
Source
 (table no.) Variables held constant




4.18 Insignif. 4.19 Age, educ., immigrant, full-
time-part-time changes, 
unempl. rate in predispl.
occup.  (sample includes 
quitters)
Belgium Daily wage rate n.d. — Yes 6.11 Age, tenure, blue-collar, 
predispl. firm size, closure, 
region, occup.d
Denmark Hourly wage rate n.d. — Yes 6.11 Age, tenure, blue-collar, 
predispl. firm size, closure, 
region, occup.d
NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics.  For Japan and Canada,
separate duration regressions were run for women and men, but no predictions at common values of the regressors were performed.
a See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b Men experience a small wage gain; women, a small loss.
c n.d. = no data available.
d Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
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Table 1.15 Wage Loss and Skills:  Do Skilled Displaced Workers Experience Smaller Wage Losses?
Comparing means Using regressions





















n.d. — Insignif. 2.22 Gender, tenure, age, 
married, immig., 




Wage rate per 
month, excluding 
bonuses
n.d. — No—educated 
workers have 
larger losses
3.18, 3.19 Gender,d age, firm 
size (pre and post), 
type of 
displacement






Comparing means Using regressions












Hourly wage rate n.d. — No real pattern, 
mostly insignif.
3.20 Gender,d age, firm 
size (pre and post), 
industry change, 
visible minority 
(result is robust to 
additional controls 




Weekly wages Yes, though 
small effect
4.8a Insignif. 4.9 Gender, tenure, 
educ., change in 








Yes, large effect 4.8b Insignif. 4.9 Gender, tenure, age, 













in predispl.  occup.e
Belgium
(white-collar)
Daily wage rate n.d. — Yes 6.11 Gender, age, tenure, 





Hourly wage rate n.d. — Insignif. 6.11 Gender, age, tenure, 
predispl. firm size, 
closure, region, 
occup.f
NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics.
a See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b n.d. = no data available.
c Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d Separate regressions were run for women and men.
e Sample includes quitters, with a dummy for displaced.
f Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
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Table 1.16 Who Loses Most from Displacement across Countries? 










Gender Men Women Either no difference, 
or women lose more 
(except Japan)
Age Young (except 
Japana)
Old Old
Tenure Juniora Varies Senior (in U.S.A., 
U.K., and Canada)
Skill level Unskilled Unskilled No consistent 
difference
a In Japan, no tenure information is available.  Thus, we cannot say whether the
observed age effect is purely due to lower tenure among the young, or what the “true”
tenure effect is.
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Table 1.17 Annual Displacement Rates: International Comparisons





U.S.A. Retrospective  
survey of 
persons
Self reports of 
permanent job loss due 
to plant closing, slack 




1993–95 Tenure greater 
than 1 year, age 
20–64










Netherlands Panel survey of  
firms
Firms’ reported layoffs, 
plus: workers moving 
into new jobs, early 
retirement, or disability 
insurance from firms 
shrinking 30% or more
1993–95 All tenure levels, 




2.6 Layoffs during 
probationary
periods excluded
Japan Panel survey of 
firms
Firms’ reports of 




with more than 5 
employees,
tenure one 
month or more, 















“contract finished,” plus 
mandatory retirement
1995 Establishments 
with more than 
5 employees, 
tenure one 
month or more, 












Firms’ reports of layoffs 
(separations due to 
“short work,” excluding 
workers who return to 
the original firm within a 
year)
1995 Establishments 
with more than 
5 employees, 
tenure one 
month or more, 




3.8 Same list of 
industries as 
Japan
May include a 






Workers’ reported job 
loss due to redundancy 
or dismissal










Australia Labor mobility 
survey, 1995
Workers ceasing a job 
due to retrenchment, ill 












Workers separating from 
dying firms, in the 
calendar year of “death” 
and the preceding 
calendar year
Adjustments made for 
“false firm deaths”
Excludes workers who 
return to original firm 
within a year








Workers separating from 
dying plants, in the 
calendar year of “death” 
and the preceding 
calendar year
Adjustments made for 
“false firm deaths”
1984–90 Age 25–50, 
tenure at least 
4 years 





rate in Table 5.4 
(for 1984–1990) 
by 7




Workers separating from 
dying firms in the 
calendar year of death 
(firms with at least 5 
employees)


















Denmark Panel of 
administrative
records
Workers separating from 
dying plants with at least 
5 employees in the 
calendar year of death










NOTE: (M) denotes “men”; (F), “women”; and (A), “all workers.”
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Table 1.18 Postdisplacement Unemployment: International Comparisons
Probability of a positive 
jobless spell
Jobless durations conditional 




















U.S.A. (all layoffs) All tenure 
levels 
0.84 2.3 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. —
Tenure greater 
than 1 year
.0.85 2.3 0.39 0.28 0.33 0.24 Tab. 2.10
Tenure 3 years 
or moreb





0.30 2.13 0.45 0.27 n.d. n.d. Tab. 2.18
Tenure greater 
than 1 year
0.30 2.13 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. —
Japan (all “layoffs”c) All tenure 
levels





Canada (all layoffs) All tenure 
levels





U.K. (all layoffs) All tenure 
levels
0.63 4.5 0.32 0.19f 0.20 0.12f Tab. 4.5
(continued)
98Table 1.18 (continued)
Probability of a positive 
jobless spell
Jobless durations conditional 




















Australia (all layoffs) All tenure 
levels, young 
workers only
n.d. — 0.27 0.15 n.d. n.d. Tab. 4.14
France (firm closures 
only)
Tenure at 
least 4 years 




least 4 years 
0.39 (M) 5:8 0.52 (M) 0.40 (M) n.d. n.d. Fig. 5.2g




0.65h 6:6 n.d. 0.63 (M) 0.72 (M) Tab. 6.7
Denmark (plant 




0.31h 6:6 n.d. 0.28 (M) 0.37 (M) n.d. Tab. 6.7
a n.d. = no data available.
b Simple average of the proportions for 3–4, 5–9, and more than 10 years, respectively (these do not differ markedly).
c Includes mandatory retirement and contract expirations; does not include shukko.
d M = men; F = women.
e Simple average of the “Canada A” and “Canada B” figures (these do not differ markedly).
f After 10 months.
g Numerical estimates based on figure.
h Percent experiencing any unemployment in the three years after displacement.
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Tenure on the predisplacement job (years)b
Source<1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ All
U.S.A. (all 
displacements)




















Japan (all)d No –4(M)e
0(F)
Tab. 3.14





















U.K. (all)f No –6 1 –5
–5 –5
–6
–6 –6 –6 –6 –6
–4 Tab. 4.7, 
4.8b
Yes –13 –7 –11 –11 –11 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10
France (mass) No 17 17 12 12 14 14 10 10 Tab. 5.10




























Tenure on the predisplacement job (years)b















































NOTE: In all cases, percentage change estimates condition on reemployment and measure rates of pay per unit of time worked.
a In all cases where a control group is used, it is continuously employed workers (not necessarily in the same plants as the displaced
workers).
b <1 = less than 1 yr.; 1 = at least a year but less than two years; 2 = at least 2 yrs. but less than 3 yrs; and so forth.
c Estimates are from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for 3 years after displacement, for workers with positive earnings in each
year after displacement.  Percentage changes are based on the following estimates taken from their Figure 1: mean (quarterly) predis-
placement earnings of $6,000 for both displaced workers and controls; mean quarterly earnings six years after displacement of $4,600
for displaced workers and $6,600 for controls.
d Excluding shukko.
e M and F indicate statistics for men and women respectively. Wage-change statistics for Australia (Chapter 4, Table 4.17) are not
included because they apply to a sample of very young workers only and are not directly comparable.  Wage-change statistics for the
Netherlands (provided in the discussion of Table 2.22, Chapter 2) are not included because they are based on a very small sample.
While some of their estimates are large in magnitude, none are significantly different from zero.
f Full time in both the predisplacement and postdisplacement job.
g Figures calculated from sample means in Table 6.10b (for wages two years after displacement) in combination with regression coeffi-
cients in Table 6.11.  The estimates with controls simply subtract off the two-year earnings growth of continuously employed workers
reported in Table 6.10b.  Due to the very small sample size and the resulting high standard errors on Table 6.11 tenure coefficients, I
report here only the  totals for all workers in their sample for Denmark.
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